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THE FEDERAL RESERVE AS LAST RESORT
Colleen Baker*
The Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United States, is one of the most impor-
tant and powerful institutions in the world. Surprisingly, legal scholarship hardly
pays any attention to the Federal Reserve or to the law structuring and governing
its legal authority. This is especially curious given the amount of legal scholarship
focused on administrative agencies that do not have anywhere near as critical a
domestic and international role as that of the Federal Reserve. At the core of what
the Federal Reserve does and should do is to conduct monetary policy so as to
saftguard pricing, including that of financial risk.
The recent financial crisis brings the importance of this role into clear resolution,
because mispriced financial risk was central to the crisis. To increase the Federal
Reserve's efficacy, recent financial reforms in Dodd-Frank created a new "last-re-
sort" role for the central bank. Ironically, these same reforms threaten the efficacy of
the Federal Reserve by increasing "moral hazard," which could lead to additional
mispricing of financial risk.
This Article aims to contribute to legal scholarship focused on the Federal Reserve,
an institution whose decisions significantly impact financial markets and much of
the rest of the world. In particular, the Article's first aim is to argue that the Federal
Reserve has a new, permanent last-resort role: market-maker of last resort. This new
responsibility flows from reforms contained in Dodd-Frank's Title VIi, which
transform and expand the Federal Reserve's last-resort-lending legal authority. This
Article's second aim is to argue that Title VIII's market stability-oriented reforms
require additional accompanying reforms to counterbalance the moral hazard and
related mispricing of financial risk that Title VIII's reforms could promote. These
proposed reforms aim to ensure that the Federal Reserve's new "last resort" lending
role does not inadvertently encourage the excessive risk taking and mispricing of
financial risk that brought us the financial crisis and Dodd-Frank in the first
place.
* Associate Professor, University of Notre Dame. Ph.D. The Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania; JD/MBA University of Virginia. I thank Anthony J. Bellia,
Matthew Barrett, Amy Coney Barrett, Joseph Bauer, Margaret Brinig, Patricia O'Hara, Daniel
Kelly, Michael Kirsch, Mark McKenna, Thomas Miles, Geoffrey Miller, John Nagle, Jeffrey
Pojanowski, David Skeel, Julian Velasco, and the many other persons who provided helpful
comments at workshops on various iterations of this research at the University of Illinois Law
School, Indiana University Law School, the Wharton Global Forum, the Notre Dame Law
School, and the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Law and Economics Association. I also thank
Emily Capehart for all her helpful research assistance. All errors are mine.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United States, is
one of the most important and powerful institutions in the world.
Although legal scholars have largely left the Federal Reserve to the
economists, its legal aspects are highly significant and merit careful
analysis by legal scholarship. Accordingly, the aim of this Article is
three-fold: (1) to analyze the new "last-resort" role given by Con-
gress to the Federal Reserve through Dodd-Frank's Title VIII, espe-
cially Title VIII's new, potentially expansive last-resort lending
authority; (2) to argue that Congress fell short of also implement-
ing in Title VIII important additional reforms to accompany the
Federal Reserve's new last-resort role; and (3) to contribute to legal
scholarship on the Federal Reserve, a critical expert administrative
agency tasked with an incomparable domestic and international
role.
During the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve was essential both
in its traditional function as the "lender of last resort" and in a
newly improvised, ad hoc capacity as a "market-maker of last re-
sort."' In this new last-resort role, the Federal Reserve acted as a
backstop or a "last resort" not only for credit creation activity cen-
tered in the traditional banking system, but also for certain credit
creation activity centered in financial markets. 2 The market-based
credit system, also known as the "shadow banking system," rivals the
traditional banking system in size and importance.' Financial in-
struments such as credit default swaps and repurchase agreements
are two important components of the market-based credit system.4
These instruments were also involved in some of the most spectacu-
lar debacles during the financial crisis.5 In transforming and ex-
panding the Federal Reserve's last-resort role, Title VIII makes the
1. See generally PEmY MEHRLING, THE Ntw LOMBARD STREET: How THE FED BECAME THE
DEALER OF LAST RESORT 1-2 (2011). Note that Merhling actually uses the term "dealer of last
resort" rather than "market-maker of last resort," which is used by other economists.
2. See generally id.
3. See generally Gary B. Gorton, Questions and Answers About the Financial Crisis (Feb. 20,
2010) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557279.
4. See generally PERRY MEHRLING, supra note 1, at 1-2.
5. A "run" in the repurchase agreement markets acted as the proximate trigger of Bear
Stearns's near collapse and Lehman Brothers' actual collapse. See generally Gary B. Groton &
Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 09-14,
Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440752. AIG nearly collapsed because
of its credit default swap contracts. See Adam Davidson, How AIG Fell Apart, REuEaRs, Sept. 18,
2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/18/us-how-aig-fell-apart-
idUSMAR85972720080918.
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Federal Reserve potentially responsible for guaranteeing the stabil-
ity of critical, volatile, highly risky, and massive segments of finan-
cial markets. 6
Three of the most spectacular collapses or near collapses during
the financial crisis-Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and American
International Group (AIG) -illustrate the importance of the Fed-
eral Reserve's new last-resort role. This is because Title VIII poten-
tially institutionalizes certain last-resort rescues-such as that of
AIG-by the Federal Reserve during the financial crisis. These
debacles also illustrate the importance of "financial market plumb-
ing," the background infrastructure systems handling the payment,
clearing, and settlement of financial market transactions such as re-
purchase agreements and credit default swaps. The purpose of
these systems is to ensure that "flows of credit, capital, and financial
risk"7 course seamlessly throughout global financial markets. Not
surprisingly, global financial market stability depends critically
upon the robust functioning of this background infrastructure.,
This is because although these systems operate in the background,
they are essentially "the 'central nervous system' of the financial
system.'"
Financial market plumbing is also the area in which the Federal
Reserve's new Title VIII last-resort lending authority could prove
vital. What is frequently underappreciated in discussions of the fi-
nancial crisis is the extent to which breakdowns in financial market
plumbing deepened the severity of the crisis.10 What is also under-
appreciated is that future systemic disruptions in financial markets
or future financial crises are likely to be centered in the financial
market plumbing.
In March 2008, the investment bank Bear Stearns confronted
what essentially amounted to an old-fashioned bank run, or what
6. See generally Gretchen Morgenson, One Safety Net That Needs to Shrink, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/business/one-safety-net-that-needs-to-
shrink.html.
7. See Darrell Duffie, Replumbing Our Financial System: Uneven Progress, BOARD OF GOVER-
NORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 2 (Mar. 17, 2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/new-
sevents/conferences/Duffie.pdf.
8. See generally id.
9. Michael H. Moskow, Public Policy and Central Counterparty Clearing, 40 ECON. PERSPS.,
no. 4, 2006, at 48, available at http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/economic
-perspectives/2006/4qtr2006_part6_moskow.cfm.
10. For example, Merhling discusses "unprecedented stress on the payments infrastruc-
ture," MERHI-ING, supra note 1, at 96, and the "utter breakdown of the underlying system of
funding liquidity. This is the plumbing behind the walls, and it failed very dramatically," id. at
124.
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finance scholars have termed a "run on repo,"' which is essentially
a bank run, but involving repurchase agreements rather than tradi-
tional bank demand deposits. Only with the assistance of the Fed-
eral Reserve, 12 which acted as a "market-maker of last resort""5 and
facilitated an emergency acquisition of the investment bank byJ.P.
Morgan Chase, ,4did Bear Stearns escape the later fate of Lehman
Brothers. In September 2008, a similar "run on repo" acted as the
proximate trigger of Lehman Brothers' financial collapse.t" Severe
disruptions in financial markets followed upon Lehman Brothers'
collapse. And right after Lehman Brothers' debacle, AIG, one of
the world's largest multinational insurance companies, almost col-
lapsed because it was unable to perform its obligations under more
than $440 billion 16 of credit default swaps (CDS) contracts, an in-
surance-like financial instrument. 17 Only the Federal Reserve's ad
hoc intervention as a market-maker of last resort"' and an eventual
total of over $180 billon 19 of government financial assistance saved
AIG from sharing Lehman Brothers' fate.
11. Repurchase agreements are essentially short-term secured financing. See generally
Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, supra note 5, at 10.
12. In discussing the acquisition of Bear Stearns byJPMorgan Chase, Thomas BaxterJr.,
General Counsel and Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
stated that "[t]he Federal Reserve stood ready to assist, if necessary. Around midday on Sun-
day, it became clear that it was necessary." Thomas Baxter, Jr., Presentation at London
School of Economics, The Legal Position of the Central Bank: The Case of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York 9 (Jan. 19, 2009), available at www2.lse.ac.uk/fmg/documents/
events/conferences/ 2009/regulatoryResponse/ 1160_Baxter.pdf.
13. Thomas Baxter noted in a 2009 speech that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
"create[d] a special purpose vehicle to hold assets acquired to facilitate the merger ofJPMor-
gan Chase and Bear Stearns," id. at 1, and that this and other SPVs "needed to be reflected
on the Federal Reserve's balance sheet," id. at 13. Alexander Mehra argues in Legal Authority
in Unusual and Exigent Circunstances: The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. PA. J.
Bus. L. 221, 238 (2010) that to acquire these assets, the Federal Reserve made a loan "only in
form" to Maiden Lane, an SPV created to buy Bear Stearns's illiquid assets to facilitate its
acquisition by J.P. Morgan Chase. As discussed in Part I.B of this Article, one definition of a
market-maker of last resort is the purchasing and selling of a wide variety of financial market
assets when markets are not functioning. Accordingly, in the Bear Stearns transaction the
Federal Reserve arguably acted as a market-maker of last resort.
14. See id.
15. See generally Gorton and Metrick, supra note 5, at 13 (quoting the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy report by Anton R. Valukas noting Lehman Brothers' heavy reliance on repur-
chase agreements).
16. See Ed Nosal, Clearing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 35 ECON. PEPSPacrivEs 137, 137
(2011), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital-assets/publications/economic_
perspectives/2011/4qtr201 l-partl-nosal.pdf.
17. See generally Adam Davidson, How AIG Fell Apart, REUTERS, Sept. 18, 2008.
18. See generally MEHR-LING, supra note 1.
19. For a reference to this number, see Fiona Law & Prudence Ho, AIG to Sell More AIA
Shares to Raise $2 Billion, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2012, http://onine.wsj.com/article/BT-GO-
20120906-706756.html.
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In both Bear Stearns's and AIG's cases, the Federal Reserve ar-
guably acted not only as a market-maker of last resort but also in
important ways as a central clearing party (CCP) of last resort. For
example, the Federal Reserve ultimately ensured performance on
certain critical financial contracts, such as AIG's CDS.2 0 One role of
a CCP is to ensure the performance of financial contracts.2 1 To
function seamlessly, financial market plumbing has long relied
upon CCPs, which function as utilities in financial markets.2 2 CCPs
lie at the heart of the plumbing of international financial markets23
and are a focus of this Article. They are ingenious inventions origi-
nally developed by private market actors primarily to ameliorate
counterparty credit risk, or the risk that one's contracting partner
might default on its obligation.2 4 CCPs essentially step into the mid-
dle of a financial trade. This means that through a legal process
known as "novation," the CCPs become the buyer to the seller and
the seller to the buyer in each financial contract.2 5 Therefore, the
CCP legally becomes the new counterparty to each original
counterparty.2 6 The implication of this is that each original
counterparty is then only exposed to the CCP's credit risk. Conse-
quently, as one banker explained, a CCP is "like the military putting
all its artillery shells in a single dump."27 The critical role of CCPs
became evident in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers' default. For
example, LCH.Clearnet Group's CCPs seamlessly managed Leh-
man Brothers' open trading positions, which amounted to a no-
tional (face) value of $10 trillion.2 8
20. See MEHRING, supra note 1, at 133.
21. See PETER NoRmAN, THE RISK CONTROLLERS: CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY CLEARING IN
GLOBALISED FINANCIAL MARKETS 7 (2011).
22. See generally id.
23. This is a financial market utility. Part II provides background details.
24. See generally Randall Kroszner, Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk?, 31 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 596, 598-604 (1999).
25. See NoRMAN, supra note 21.
26. See generally id. at ch. 2.
27. Credit Derivatives: The Great Untangling, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 2008, at 85, 86 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted) (quoting an unnamed banker).
28. This is a "notional" amount from which contractual payments are calculated. See
PETER NoRmAN, THE RISK CONTROLLERS: CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY CLEARING IN GLOBALISED
FINANCIAL MARKETs 26 (2011). LCH.Clearnet Group is based in the U.K.; these numbers are
representative of amounts handled by significant central clearing parties.
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Given their stellar performance during the financial crisis, CCPs
are now the focus of widespread international financial market reg-
ulatory reforms that seek to mandate their increased use.29 One ob-
jective of these regulatory reforms is to promote the seamless
functioning of financial market plumbing.30 Not surprisingly, CCPs
are now arguably the most important centers of systemic risk in fi-
nancial markets.3 1
Ironically, these international regulatory reforms may actually in-
crease financial market instability.32 Federal Reserve Chairman Ben-
jamin Bernanke cautioned in a speech focused on CCPs that "if you
put all your eggs in one basket, you better watch that basket. " 33 The
Chairman's caution is easily understood in light of the role of and
the staggering sums handled by these entities. For example, Ice
Clear Credit LLC, recently designated by the Financial Stability
Oversight Council3 4 as a "systemically significant"35 financial market
utility (and therefore one that could potentially receive assistance
from Title VIII's new last-resort lending authority) is the leading
CCP for credit-default swaps in the United States.3 6 Importantly,
"[t] he value of trades on a CCPs books can be awe-inspiring." 37 And
"[t] he outstanding amounts of credit default swaps [worldwide] are
29. For example, the G20 in 2009 agreed to significantly increase the use of central
clearing parties in the over-the-counter derivative markets by the end of 2012. See FIN. STABIL-
IY BD., OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS: THIRD PROGRESS REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION
(Foreword) (2012), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r_120615.pdf.
30. For example, see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 802, 124 Star. 1376, 2113 (2010) [hereinafter "Dodd-Frank"] (the
"Findings and Purposes" of Dodd-Frank's Title VIII regulations on payment, clearing, and
settlement systems).
31. Systemic risk refers to the risk that, as a result of interconnections within the finan-
cial markets, the collapse of one financial institution will trigger a domino-like collapse of
additional financial institutions.
32. See BANK OF ENG., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 6 (2011), available at http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/fsr/2011/fsr3O.aspx.
33. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Clear-
inghouses, Financial Stability, and Financial Reform, Speech at 2011 Financial Markets Con-
ference, Stone Mountain, Georgia (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bernanke20llO404ahtm (quoting Mark Twain's character, Pudd'nhead
Wilson).
34. The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was created in Title I of Dodd-
Frank and is a council of financial regulators tasked with oversight of financial market
stability.
35. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Financial Stability Oversight Council
Makes First Designations in Effort to Protect Against Future Financial Crises, July 18, 2012,
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tgl645.aspx.
36. See generally Ice Clear Credit, IcE CLEAR CREDIT, https://www.theice.com/
clearcredit.jhtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
37. NORvAN, supra note 21, at 10.
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many times world GDP.""s No wonder financial regulators refer to a
failure of such "baskets" as a potential "financial Armageddon."39
CCPs "really are too big to fail."4 All eyes would turn to the Federal
Reserve to do something to prevent such a catastrophe. The Fed-
eral Reserve's new Title VIII last-resort lending authority,4' a pri-
mary focus of this Article, could potentially provide assistance in
this situation.
But this Article also argues that well-intentioned, yet poorly de-
signed regulatory reforms can actually increase systemic risk by cre-
ating significant moral hazard, which leads to the mispricing of
financial risk. 42 "Moral hazard" is the tendency to exercise less care
or to alter one's behavior when a third-party such as an insurer
could be partially or fully responsible for the costs associated with
this behavioral change.43 For example, financial market utilities
such as central clearing parties might engage in additional risk tak-
ing if a third-party insurer, such as the Federal Reserve, could po-
tentially provide a last-resort backstop in a financial emergency.
The creation or presence of moral hazard contributes to the mis-
pricing of financial risk. This is because risk-taking activities be-
come cheaper if part of the downside cost of such activities can
potentially be shared by a third-party insurer or a government safety
net. For example, banks considered by financial markets as "too-
big-to-fail" can borrow money more cheaply than banks not simi-
larly viewed. 44 Economist Raghuram Rajan argues that "the primary
reason for a systemic breakdown [of banking institutions] is
38. PH4ILLIP WOOD, ALLEN & OVERY, WHAT Is A CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY IN FINANCIAL
MARKETS? 5 (2009), available at http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt-
consultations/]ibrary?l=/financia-services/derivatives-derivatives/individual-respondents/
wood_enpdf/_EN_1.0&a=d.
39. Too Many Latent Triggers of Next Crisis, FIN. TIMES, May 17, 2011, http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/9097e23e-8081-1 leO-adca-00144feabdcO.html#axzz22ol PH5ft.
40. WOOD, supra note 38, at 4.
41. This new lending authority is in Section 806 of Dodd-Frank's Title VIII. See Dodd-
Frank § 806.
42. For example, "the world's 29 most important banks are receiving a de facto subsidy
of $700bn a year in the form of cheaper borrowing costs, because investors believe that gov-
ernments would never let them go bust." Brooke Masters and Patrick Jenkins, Top Regulators
Say Bank Reforms Fall Short, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2012 (referring to remarks by Andrew
Haldane, director of financial stability at the Bank of England, in a recent speech). Because
many market participants also believe that governments would never let a significant central
clearing party go bust, important CCPs will likely also benefit from significant subsidies.
43. See HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK REGULATION
60-63 (2010).
44. See BASEL COMMrrrEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT
BANKS: ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE ADDITIONAL Loss ABSORBENCY REQUIREMENT 2
(2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.pdf.
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invariably the underpricing of risk,"'45 and that "[t]he underpricing
of risk in the period leading up to the recent crisis stemmed, in
part, from anticipated government or central bank intervention in
markets." 46 Mispriced financial risk leads to excessive risk-taking by
financial markets and institutions. For example, AIG significantly
underpriced the credit protection sold through its credit default
swaps. 47 Had AIG properly priced this credit protection, fewer con-
tracts would likely have been sold. Excessive risk-taking can then
lead to future financial crises and their attendant disasters, such as
AIG's collapse. In financial crises, governments generally step in to
provide stability to financial markets and institutions so as to avert
even greater economic collapses. But the problem is that a stabil-
ity/crisis loop then potentially begins again, with the moral hazard
created by the government stability measures taken in prior finan-
cial crises.48
Therefore, a critical tension exists between financial market sta-
bility and moral hazard. Dodd-Frank's Title VIII grants the Federal
Reserve a new last-resort lending authority for financial market util-
ities designated as "systemically important" in "unusual or exigent"
circumstances. 49 This reform addresses part of this financial crisis
loop, because it aims to bolster financial market stabilit. But Dodd-
Frank's Title VIII falls short, because it does not sufficiently address
the increased moral hazard and related mispricing of financial risk
that will likely result from the measures it provides to promote sta-
bility. Therefore, it risks increasing financial market instability and
the mispricing of financial risk.
In other words, the moral hazard created by Dodd-Frank's Title
VIII reforms could act as an incentive for financial market utilities,
such as systemically important CCPs, which have traditionally been
heralded as paragons of private market risk management, to relax
45. RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: How HIDDEN F.AcruRZs STILI. THREATEN THE
WORLD ECONOMY 160 (2010).
46. Id.
47. See generally MEHRLING, supra note 1, at 129-30. Rajan notes that "[p]riately, AIGFP
executives said the swaps contracts were like selling insurance for catastrophic events that
would never happen: they brought in money for nothing!" RAJAN, supra note 45, at 135.
48. In Fault Lines, Rajan at refers to the Federal Reserve as "tak[ing] us from bubble to
bubble by cutting interest rates to near zero and flooding the market with liquidity." R'JAN,
supra note 45, at 168. In financial crises, central banks frequently lower interest rates and
provide financial institutions increased access to liquidity. Near-zero interest rates encourage
excessive risk-taking because such environments make borrowed funds incredibly inexpen-
sive. Unfortunately, this situation also risks laying the foundations for future financial crises.
49. Dodd-Frank § 806(b). Additional requirements also exist for using this lending au-
thority. These requirements are discussed in detail in Part II.B.4.
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their risk management practices. Relaxed risk management prac-
tices could decrease a CCP's costs, which should increase its profit-
ability. But it could also lead to additional, and possibly excessive,
risk-taking. In sum, the Federal Reserve's new "last-resort" role
could unintentionally lead to the kind of moral hazard, systemic
risk, and mispricing of financial risk that ultimately triggered the
2008 financial crisis and presented a need for the Federal Reserve's
stability assistance and Dodd-Frank in the first place.
During the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve asserted de facto
control over the financial system. 50 It also assumed an ad hoc role as
the market-maker of last resort.5 1 The Federal Reserve provided an
unprecedented amount of "last resort" financial assistance to a wide
range of financial market institutions during the crisis. 52 Bloomberg
news estimates that the Federal Reserve's assistance to the financial
system reached approximately $7.7 trillion; 3 the Federal Reserve
itself places this number closer to a mere $1.5 trillion.54 Either
amount is staggering. Both numbers highlight what have become
top concerns for international financial regulators: international li-
quidity shortages, mispricing, and mismanagement. 55
Liquidity is not free. Liquidity risk is one of the fundamental
risks in financial markets. All else being equal, liquid financial as-
sets are less risky than illiquid ones and, therefore, worth more.5 6
Financial investors generally expect to receive a "liquidity pre-
mium" for illiquid financial assets. 57 In the past, however, both
economic and financial theories have sometimes treated liquidity as
50. Knowledge@Wharton, Wharton Faculty Teach-In on the Global Economic Crisis, YouTuBE
(Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfvODCAYU-0 (lecture by Richard
Herring).
51. See generally MEHRLING, supra note 1.
52. Liquidity can be thought of as "the ease with which value can be realized from as-
sets." Andrew Crockett, Market Liquidity and Financial Stability, FIN. STABILITY REV., Feb. 2008,
at 13, 14, available at http://www.banque-france.fr/fileadmin/user-upload/banque de-
france/publications/Revuede_la stabilitejfinanciere/rsfL0208.pdf.
53. Bob Ivry, Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks $13 Billion Undis-
closed to Congress, BLOOMBERG MKTS. MAG., Nov. 27, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-11-28/secre t-fed-loans-undisclosed-to-co ngress-gave-ban ks-13-billion-in-in come.h tml.
54. Benjamin Bernanke, Chairman of the Fed. Reserve, Letter to the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs 2 (Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://www.federalreserve
.gov/generalinfo/foia/emergency-lending-financial-crisis-201 1206.pdf.
55. For example, international banking regulations such as Basel III increasingly focus
on liquidity considerations. A summary table of the Basel III proposed regulatory framework
is available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf.
56. See generally JOHN HIBBERT, AXEL KIRCHNER, GAVIN KRETZSCHMAR, Ruos-A Li & ALEX-
ANDER McNEIL, LIQUIDrry PREMIUM LITERATURE: REVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL AND EMpIRICAL
EVIDENCE (2009), available at http://www.barrhibb.com/documents/downloads/
Liquidity-PremiumLiteratureReview.PDF.
57. See generally id.
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costless.58 And international financial institutions have long misman-
aged and mispriced liquidity risk.59 Not surprisingly, liquidity assis-
tance emerged as one of the most sought-after remedies provided
by the Federal Reserve and central banks around the world during
the financial crisis. Dodd-Frank's Title VIII implicitly acknowledges
the potential for certain financial market utilities such as CCPs to
experience credit and liquidity problems by its creation of a new
last- resort lending authority for the Federal Reserve. This possibil-
ity is likely one reason Chairman Bernanke noted the need for reg-
ulatory vigilance over certain financial market "baskets. '60
Alarmingly, many of these baskets and their accompanying "too big
to fail" issues involve the very types of financial instruments that not
only were the key triggers of the most significant collapses in the
last financial crisis, but even today remain among the most impor-
tant systemic risks in the financial system.6'
Accordingly, this Article's first aim is to introduce the idea of a
"market-maker of last resort" and to argue that reforms in Dodd-
Frank's Title VIII, specifically its new last-resort lending authority,
transform and expand the Federal Reserve's traditional last-resort
role. Its second aim is to argue that Title VIII's stability-oriented
provisions require additional reform to counterbalance and mini-
mize the moral hazard and related mispricing of financial risk that
these reforms could create. These proposed additional reforms aim
to ensure that the Federal Reserve's new last-resort role does not
inadvertently encourage the kind of excessive risk-taking and mis-
pricing of financial risk that brought us the financial crisis and
Dodd-Frank in the first place. This Article assumes that Tide VIII
has, practically speaking, settled the controversial normative ques-
tion of whether the Federal Reserve's last resort role should also
include the function of market-maker of last resort. It also assumes
that this affirmative answer will remain unchanged for the foresee-
able future.
58. MEHRLING, supra note 1, at 5. According to Andrew Haldane, "liquidity droughts
were perhaps the defining feature of the financial crisis during 2007 and 2008." Andrew
Haldane, Exec. Dir. of Fin. Stability at the Bank of Eng., Speech: Haircuts 4 (Aug. 1, 2011),
available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/documents/speeches/201 1 /speech5l2
.pdf.
59. See generally INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL. FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 75 (2011),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2011/01/pdf/text.pdf.
60. Bernanke, supra note 33.
61. For example, several recent reports have warned about the continuing risk of insta-
bility in the tri-party repo markets. See, e.g., Triparty Repo Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Sec., Ins. & Inv., 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of MatthewJ. Eichner, Deputy Dir., Div. of
Research and Statistics of the Fed. Reserve, Aug. 2, 2012), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newseven ts/testimony/eichner20120802a.htn.
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Part I provides a brief background of the Federal Reserve, its
traditional lender-of-last-resort role, and its long-standing emer-
gency powers under §13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.62 It then
analyzes the concept of a market-maker of last resort. Part II pro-
vides an overview of CCPs and the financial market systems in which
they play a starring role. This Part also analyzes Title VIII's financial
market utility reforms. Part III argues that although normative dis-
cussion among economists about the proper scope of the Federal
Reserve's last-resort role is still nascent, Congress has in fact
ushered the Federal Reserve into this capacity on a permanent basis
through Title VIII. Part IV proposes the additional reforms Con-
gress should implement to minimize the moral hazard and related
mispricing of financial risk that could result from the Federal Re-
serve's new last-resort role. These reforms include additional finan-
cial mandates, increased transparency and accountability measures,
restructuring of financial markets that are most likely to require the
assistance of a market-maker of last resort, and increased private
sector second-to-last-resort mechanisms. Part V concludes.
I. THE FEDERAL RESERVE: TRADITIONAL LENDER OF LAST RESORT
AND Now MARKET-MAKER OF LAST RESORT
This part first provides a brief background history of the Federal
Reserve, its traditional lender-of-last-resort role as expressed
through its discount window and open market operations, and its
related 13(3) emergency powers. It also introduces the concept of a
market-maker of last resort. Readers familiar with the Federal Re-
serve, CCPs, and payment, clearing, and settlement systems should
read I.B and then continue reading at Part II.B.
A. The Federal Reserve System
1. History
The Federal Reserve is a central bank born of financial and polit-
ical crises. Perhaps because the Constitution did not establish a cen-
tral bank, U.S. banking and banking regulation have always been
permeated by constitutional concerns.63
62. 12 U.S.C. § 343(A) (2006).
63. See, e.g., Osborne v Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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The first U.S. Congress, upon the studied recommendation of
Alexander Hamilton, established the First Bank of the United
States in 1791. 64 The First Bank's duration proved brief. A conflict
between national and state banking interests (aligned with agrarian
powers) allowed Bank opponents to block renewal of the First
Bank's charter. 65
The War of 1812, lax state regulation, and financial emergencies,
reversed the misfortunes of national banking proponents. 66 Their
fortunes rose with the establishment of a Second Bank of the
United States in 1816.67 In 1819, the U.S. Supreme Court decision
in McCulloch v Maryland settled the Bank's constitutionality. 68
Nevertheless, the turbulent political history of banking contin-
ued when Congress did not renew the charter of the Second
Bank. 69 The defeat of the renewal of the Second Bank's charter un-
fortunately did not also defeat the wars and financial crises that
arose in subsequent years, in which state banks dominated the
banking landscape. 70 Overall, the state-banking atmosphere, partic-
ularly because of the introduction of "free banking"7 practices, was
"laissez faire in the extreme '72 and "vulnerable to financial panics. ' 73
By 1864, there was a renewed focus on a federal banking system,
and a "national banking system" arose that "outlasted the crisis [cre-
ated by the Civil War] and became one of the central features of
the contemporary bank regulatory system, [and] also established
the federal-state 'dual banking system' that has been a characteristic
of U.S. commercial banking ever since." 74 Nevertheless, it was not
until the 1907 financial crisis that Congress, following the advice of
the "National Monetary Commission, ' 75 decided to create a central
bank.76
Thus, more than one hundred years after the country's found-
ing, following years of constitutional controversy and a spectrum of
64. See generally MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION 1-27 (2d ed.
2003).
65. Id.
66. See generally id. at § 1.3.
67. See generally id.
68. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 316.
69. See generally MAILOY, supra note 64, at § 1.4.
70. Id.
71. "Free banking" meant that state "statutes began to emerge, allowing for organization
of state banks by general legislation, rather than by special legislative act." Id. at § 1.4
72. Id. at § 1.4.
73. WiLLtAM Lovwrr, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LAW 45 (6th ed. 2005).
74. MALLOY, supra note 64, at § 1.6.
75. Malloy explains that this Commission "was created in 1908 to investigate the causes
of the panic [of 1907] and recommend remedial legislation." Id.
76. Id.
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financial crises, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 established the Fed-
eral Reserve System.77 At long last, the United States had a central
bank, the product of "extensive study and intense political maneu-
vering." 7 The Federal Reserve has since evolved into one of the
most important and powerful institutions in the world.
2. Responsibility and Structure
The Federal Reserve System has a unique structure that reflects
the frequently turbulent history of U.S. banking. 79 Its traditional re-
sponsibilities include (1) conducting monetary and credit policy "in
pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long
term interest rates";80 (2) banking regulation and supervision; (3)
oversight of financial market stability and systemic risk; and (4) pro-
vision of various financial services-for example providing accounts
and payment settlement services such as Fedwire. s1
The first of these, monetary policy-control over the country's
money supply-is widely viewed as the primary responsibility of cen-
tral banks such as the Federal Reserve.12 Open market operations-
77. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2006)).
78. MILTON SCHROEDER, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS § 3.01
(1995).
79. As an entirety, the Federal Reserve System includes the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, the Federal Open Markets Committee, the twelve regional Federal Reserve
Banks, regional district member banks, and several advisory committees. See How Is the Federal
Reserve System Structured?, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federal
reserve.gov/faqs/about_12593.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). The heart of the Federal Re-
serve System is the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. Id. It is an independent gov-
ernment agency headed by a seven-member committee appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. See Who Are the Members of the Federal Reserve Board and How
Are They Selected?, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Svs., http://www.federalreserve
.gov/faqs/about_12591.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). As of the writing of this Article,
Chairman Bernanke is the Chairman of the Board of Governors. See Board Members, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Svs., http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/
board/default.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
80. FED. RESERVE BD., FEDERAL RESERVE SVSTEM: PuRPosEs AND FUNCTIONS 1 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pfcomplete.pdf.
81. Id. Among the three wholesale payment services operated by the Federal Reserve is
the Fedwire Funds Service (Fedwire), which is a real-time gross settlement system designed to
settle funds electronically between banks. See FedwireA and National Settlement Services, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed43.html (last
visited Aug. 9, 2012).
82. See Structure of the Federal Reserve System, THE FED. RESERVE, http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri3.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 3012).
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the buying and selling of (generally) U.S. Treasury securities 83-is
one of the Federal Reserve's main tools of monetary policy.8 4 By
buying and selling securities to and from financial institutions
known as primary dealers, the Federal Reserve influences the
amount of money available in the economy.85 The Federal Reserve
uses open market operations, in conjunction with its discount win-
dow lending facility, to align the overnight, unsecured interest rate
at which banks lend to one another-the effective federal funds
rate-with the target federal funds rate, which is set by the Federal
Reserve. 86 These critical open market operations are overseen by
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which is composed
of the Board of Governors, the president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, and four additional Federal Reserve Bank presi-
dents who rotate through this position.8 7
Another primary tool that the Federal Reserve uses in con-
ducting monetary policy is reserve requirements. The Board of Gov-
ernors sets reserve requirements, which mandate that all depository
institutions maintain a certain fraction of their deposits in cash or
in accounts at the Federal Reserve.8 Whether or not they are mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve System, all depository institutions are
required to maintain these reserve balances to strengthen their li-
quidity resources.8 9 Required reserve levels rarely change.90
3. The Discount Window
The final traditional tool of the Federal Reserve's monetary pol-
icy operations is its discount window. It is also perhaps the strongest
and most potentially controversial tool in the Federal Reserve's ar-
senal.9' Aptly described as "the Fed's pawnshop for commercial
83. In open market operations, the Federal Reserve could also buy or sell other types of
collateral. Depending upon the collateral bought or sold, the Federal Reserve could be act-
ing as a market-maker of last resort.
84. See Purposes and Functions of the Federal Reserve System, THE FED. RESERVE, http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pfLcomplete.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2012).
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Reserve requirements are mandated for all depository institutions, regardless of
whether they are members of the Federal Reserve System. See 12 U.S.C. § 461 (2006).
89. See id.
90. See THE FED. RESERVE, supra note 84, at 31.
91. See generally RANDALL S. KROSZNER & WILLIAM MELICK, THE RESPONSE OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE TO THE RECENT BANKING AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 5 (2009), available at http://faculty.
chicagobooth.edu/randal.kroszner/research/pdf/KrosznerMelickFedCrisisResponse.pdf.
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banks facing short-term liquidity problems,"9 2 the discount window
has two main purposes. 93 First, it is used in combination with open-
market operations to align the effective Federal funds rate, an over-
night interest rate at which banks lend to one another, with the
Federal Reserve's announced target Federal funds rate, the interest
rate at which the Federal Reserve wants interbank lending to hap-
pen in practice.94 Second, it loans money to individual depository
institutions under "primary, secondary, and seasonal credit pro-
grams." 95 And the discount window has traditionally enabled the
Federal Reserve to act as the lender of last resort to the commercial
banking system. 96
4. The Federal Reserve as Lender of Last Resort
Both open market operations and the discount window enable
the Federal Reserve to act as the U.S. lender of last resort.97 In this
role, the Federal Reserve is focused on the overall stability of the
traditional banking system. Through open market operations, the
Federal Reserve can quickly inject additional liquidity into the
banking system when credit conditions are tight. Alternatively, the
Federal Reserve can use its discount window to provide targeted
injections of credit and liquidity.
In Lombard Street, Walter Bagehot described the role of a lender
of last resort: to lend freely, for good collateral, at high interest
rates to solvent institutions.98 Since Bagehot's time, the lender-of-
92. Jose Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity: Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the New Credit Market,
34J. CORP. L. 447, 448 (2009).
93. FED. RESERVE BD., FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 45 (2005),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pfcomplete.pdf.
94. Id. at 2.
95. See id. at 46.
96. See generally James Bullard, President's Message: The Fed as Lender of Last Resort, THE
REG'I ECONOMIST,Jan. 2009, available at http://www.sdouisfed.org/publications/pubassets/
pdf/re/2009/a/presmes.pdf); see also generally Joao Santos and Stavros Pertistiani, Why Do
Central Banks Have Discount Windows? FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. (Mar. 30, 2011), http://
libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2011/03/why-do-central-banks-have-discount-
windows.html.
97. Id. at 45. See generally Joao Santos & Stavros Perisfiani, Why Do Central Banks
Have Discount Windows?, FED. RESERvE BANK OF N.Y. (Mar. 30, 2011), http://
libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2011/03/why-do-central-banks-have-discount-
windows.html.
98. See Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., The Repertoire of
Official Sector Interventions in the Financial System: Last Resort Lending, Market-Making,
and Capital, Remarks at the Bank of Japan 2009 International Conference (May 27-28,
2009), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/
2009/speech390.pdf.
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last-resort role has traditionally been considered the bedrock func-
tion of central banks. High or penalty interest rates are designed
both to discourage banks from unnecessary reliance upon a lender
of last resort and to minimize the moral hazard created by the pres-
ence of this public backstop. 99 The requirement of quality collateral
is to ensure that a bank needs assistance because it is illiquid, not
because it is insolvent due to a balance sheet filled with worthless
assets. 100 In practice, however, it can be difficult for both market
participants and financial regulators to distinguish between liquid-
ity issues and insolvency in a financial crisis. 10 1 Not surprisingly,
therefore, the discount window has sometimes been used to assist
insolvent banking institutions. 10 2
Around the world, central banks act as "lenders of last resort."
The Federal Reserve was "extraordinarily active" as a lender of last
resort during the recent financial crisis. 103 But why are lenders of
last resort necessary?
Modern economies rely on access to credit for their growth.
Banks have traditionally supplied the bulk of this credit. Banks have
a fragile financial structure, which creates vulnerabilities in individ-
ual banking institutions and in the overall banking system. These
vulnerabilities arise because the liabilities of banks are generally
short-term, such as demand deposits or overnight wholesale fund-
ing like repos, but their assets are typically long-term, often highly
illiquid, credit-creating financial contracts. This difference results
in what is known as a "maturity mismatch" between a bank's assets
and liabilities. The "maturity mismatch" between a bank's assets
and liabilities can become highly problematic, making banks sus-
ceptible to runs and financial panics. This mismatch is characteris-
tic of financial institution intermediaries engaged in the practice of
"maturity transformation," which means using short-term liabilities
to fund longer-term assets.
In a bank run or panic, an otherwise solvent depository institu-
tion suddenly requires additional emergency "funding liquidity."
Funding liquidity is the ability "to attract external finance at short
99. Santos & Peristiani, supra note 96.
100. See generally SCHOONER & TAYLOR, supra note 43, at 53 passim.
101. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Avoiding Eight-Alarm Fires in the Political
Economy of Systemic Risk Management 47 (Columbia Law & Econ. Research Paper, No. 369,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfmabstractid=1553880. See generally
MEHRLING, supra. note 1, at 44-45; Santos & Peristiani, supra note 97.
102. See Anna Schwartz, The Misuse of the Fed's Discount Window, Remarks at Sixth
Annual HomerJones Memorial Lecture (1992), available at http://research.slouisfed.org/
publications/review/92/09/Misuse SepOct1992.pdf; see also Gordon & Muller, supra note
101, at 46.
103. James Bullard, supra note 96, at 3.
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notice, subject to low transaction costs and at a financial cost that
reflects the [institution's] fundamental solvency." 104 Funding liquid-
ity replenishes the liability side of a bank's balance sheet;1 0 5 it can
replace demand deposits or other short-term funding that is sud-
denly on the run. The role of a lender of last resort is to provide
this funding when a solvent bank finds itself unable to borrow funds
from other banks or market participants. The collapse of one de-
pository institution risks triggering further runs and panics in the
banking system. In severe cases, such disruptions in the banking
system could cause a broader economic collapse. Without a lender
of last resort to supply emergency "funding liquidity," liquidity
problems could quickly become solvency issues, because a bank
could be forced to conduct a fire sale of its assets. To prevent this
circumstance, this is the moment in which central banks such as the
Federal Reserve can step into the gap as "lenders of last resort" to
provide emergency funding liquidity.10 6
Non-bank financial institutions, such as Bear Stearns, Lehman
Brothers, and shadow banks,10 7 can also engage in maturity trans-
formation. Accordingly, the structure of their balance sheets would
also exhibit maturity mismatches similar to those that characterize
the balance sheets of traditional banks. These financial institutions
also provide credit to the economy and are part of what is known as
the "market-based credit system" or the "shadow banking system." 08
Though such financial institutions can share the financial fragility
of traditional banks, however, they are not similarly regulated. 10 9
And importantly, the explicit government backstops present in the
traditional banking system to combat runs and panics, such as de-
posit insurance and the lender of last resort, are absent from this
system.110 These non-bank financial institutions became the epicen-
ter of the financial crisis. This led to calls for the Federal Reserve to
104. WiLLEM H. BUITER, CEirRAL BANKs AND FINANCLc CRIsis 16 (2008), available at
http://www.wilembuiter.com/hole.pdf.
105. See id.
106. See generally supra note 97. Note that federal deposit insurance regimes are also de-
signed to ameliorate runs and panics.
107. See Sandra C. Krieger, Executive Vice-President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Reducing
the Systemic Risk in Shadow Maturity Transformation, Remarks at the Global Association of
Risk Professionals 12th Annual Risk Management Convention (Mar. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2011/kril 10308.html.
108. See generally id.
109. See generally Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking Sys-
tem (Oct. 18, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract.id= 1676947.
110. See generally Krieger, supra note 107.
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become a market-maker of last resort and thereby act as a backstop
to such institutions in financial crises. 111
5. The Discount Window and the Federal Reserve's 13(3)
Emergency Powers
Depression-era amendments to the Federal Reserve Act added its
13(3) emergency power. This power enabled the Federal Reserve to
provide extensive emergency discount window financial assistance
during the crisis to "any individual, partnership, or corporation" in
"unusual and exigent circumstances."11 2 But this longstanding
emergency authority was largely dormant 13 until it was resurrected
with a vengeance during the recent financial crisis. 114
Chairman Bernanke explained the importance of the Federal
Reserve's 13(3) emergency power during the financial crisis:
As the financial crisis spread, the continuing pullback of pri-
vate funding contributed to the illiquid and even chaotic con-
ditions in financial markets and prompted runs on various
types of financial institutions, including primary dealers and
money market mutual funds. To arrest these runs and help
stabilize the broader financial system, the Federal Reserve
used its emergency lending authority under Section 13(3) of
111. See, e.g., Willem Buiter, The Fed as Market-Maker of Last Resort: Better Late than Never,
FT.CoM (Mar. 12, 2008, 2:27 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2008/03/the-fed-as-
market-maker-of-last-resort-better-late-than-never/#axzz29CzyekMM.
112. Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., supra note 12, at 4. The Fed's 13(3) emergency powers are
now set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 343(A) as follows:
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Federal Reserve Board (Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System], by the affirmative vote of not less than five mem-
bers, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the said board
may determine, at rates established in accordance with the provisions of section 14,
subdivision (d) of this Act [12 U.S.C. § 357], to discount for any participant in any
program or facility with broad-based eligibility, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange
when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to
the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank: Provided, That before discounting any
such note, draft, or bill of exchange, the Federal reserve bank shall obtain evidence
that such participant in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility is unable to
secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions. All such dis-
counts for any participant in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility shall
be subject to such limitations, restrictions, and regulations as the Federal Reserve
Board (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System] may prescribe.
113. See id. (explaining that the 13(3) emergency power had not been used since the
1930s).
114. In reading through this section, readers should carefully note that Tide VIII's new
emergency authority bears many similarities to the Federal Reserve's longstanding 13(3)
emergency authority.
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the Federal Reserve Act-an authority not used since the
Great Depression-to provide short-term backup funding to
certain nondepository institutions through a number of tem-
porary facilities.11 5
For example, when Bear Stearns faced imminent financial collapse
in March 2008, the legal authority for the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York's emergency $30 billion dollar loan, upon which JPMor-
gan Chase's acquisition of Bear Stearns hinged, was rooted in sec-
tion 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.'1 6
Ultimately, the Federal Reserve's extensive use of its 13(3) emer-
gency powers during the financial crisis proved highly controver-
sial.117 As a result, Congress subsequently circumscribed this
authority in the Dodd-Frank Act by adding several accountability
requirements to the Federal Reserve's use of this emergency
power. 18
First, Dodd-Frank prohibits the Federal Reserve's 13(3) emer-
gency power from being used solely to assist an individual financial
institution, and allows it to be deployed only to provide liquidity to
a "participant in any program or facility with broad-based
eligibility."'119
Second, Dodd-Frank imposes the requirement that the Treasury
Department approve the Federal Reserve's use of these powers.12 0
The Federal Reserve is required to report to designated congres-
sional committees within seven days of using its 13(3) emergency
115. Ben S. Bernanke, Federal Reserve's Exit Strategy, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RE-
SERVE Sys. (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke
20100210a.htm (footnotes omitted). Gretchen Morgenson notes that at the "peak of its crisis
lending in December 2008," the Federal Reserve supplied an incredible $1.2 trillion to finan-
cial institutions. Gretchen Morgenson, The Rescue That Missed Main Street, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
2011, at BU1.
116. See supra note 13. See also Actions by the New York Fed in Response to Liquidity Pressures in
Financial Markets: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong.
(2008) (statement of Timothy F. Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer, Fed. Re-
serve Bank of N.Y., Actions by the New York Fed in Response to Liquidity Pressures in Finan-
cial Markets, Apr. 3, 2008).
117. See, e.g., Alexander Mehra, supra note 13 (arguing that certain of the Federal
Reserve's emergency actions in the financial crisis went beyond its legal authority).
118. See Dodd-Frank § 1101.
119. See id. Much of the extensive financial assistance provided by the Federal Reserve
using its 13(3) emergency authority during the crisis was in the form of a program or facility.
See The Federal Reserve's Response to the Financial Crisis and Actions to Foster Maximum Employment
and Stability, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Svs., http://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/bst.crisisresponse.htm (last updated Oct. 31, 2012). Therefore, it is unclear
to what extent this change actually circumscribes this emergency power in practice.
120. Dodd-Frank § 1101.
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authority.1 2t This report must include information such as the justi-
fication for invoking 13(3) emergency authority, the identity of the
borrowers, the dates and amounts of borrowing, and the material
terms of the loans. 122 The Federal Reserve must also send Congress
updated reports every thirty days during which these loans are
outstanding. 23
Additionally, Dodd-Frank makes numerous other statutory
changes to the Federal Reserve's 13(3) emergency authority. First,
it instructs the Federal Reserve to develop "policies and procedures
governing emergency lending" under its 13(3) emergency author-
ity.1 24 Such standards are to be designed, among other things, to
insure that this emergency authority provides only emergency li-
quidity rather than a bailout to an insolvent institution. 125 Second,
it requires that the collateralization of discount window loans be
sufficient to protect taxpayers from loss. 2 6 In fact, the Federal Re-
serve must assign a value to all collateral used to secure 13(3) emer-
gency funding, and the loans must be terminated in a timely
manner.
127
These new Dodd-Frank collateral requirements somewhat nar-
row the expansive effect of 1991 amendments to the Federal Re-
serve Act. These amendments significantly broadened the types of
collateral eligible to secure discount window funding via the 13(3)
emergency authority.128 They also facilitated the Federal Reserve's
extensive use of its 13(3) emergency power during the financial cri-
sis. The overall effect of this change was that 13(3) emergency dis-
count window funding only needed to be secured "to the
satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank"'2 9 rather than secured by
the types of collateral generally available for Federal Reserve lend-
ing to traditional commercial banks and depository institutions. 130
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Binyamin Appelbaum & Neil Irwin, Congress's Afterthought, Wall Street's Trllion Dol-
lars, WAsH. PosT, May 30, 2009, at Al.
129. 12 U.S.C. § 343(A) (2006).
130, The 1991 amendments deleted the phrase "of the kinds and maturities made eligi-
ble for discount for member banks under other provisions of this Act"; therefore, the re-
quirement then became that the lending was merely secured to the satisfaction of the Federal
Reserve banks. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), Pub.
L. 102-242, Section 473, 105 Stat. 2236, 2386 (1991). See also Walker F. Todd, FDICIA's Emer-
gency Liquidity Provisions, 29 ECON. Rv. no. 3 (1993). Traditionally, commercial banks have
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This change effectively "allow[ed] the Fed to lend directly to non-
bank firms during times of emergency" 133 and "to lend directly to
securities firms during times of emergency.' ' 3 2 Professor Jeffrey
Gordon and Christopher Muller suggested that this change
"raise[d] novel questions about what it means for borrower debt to
be 'secured to the satisfaction to the Federal reserve bank.'"133
In sum, Dodd-Frank circumscribed the Federal Reserve's 13(3)
emergency authority while adding several new, significant accounta-
bility and transparency requirements for its use. Below, I analyze
Title VIII's new last-resort lending authority, which could poten-
tially be used for certain financial market utilities in "unusual or
exigent circumstances." Although this new last-resort lending au-
thority in many ways resembles the Federal Reserve's traditional
13(3) emergency powers, it is a significant, distinct, critical new last-
resort lending authority. Importantly, several of Dodd-Frank's ac-
countability and transparency requirements now mandated for the
use of the Federal Reserve's 13(3) emergency authority, which are
discussed above, are not similarly mandated in Title VIII's new last-
resort lending authority.13 4
B. The Concept of a Market-Maker of Last Resort
Economist Perry Mehrling argues that during the financial crisis,
the Federal Reserve acted as the de facto "dealer of last resort"135 to
used highly regulated, high-grade, limited types of assets as collateral to secure discount win-
dow funding. KROSZNER & MELICK, supra note 91, at 8. Kroszner and Melick explain that the
impact of the "traditional tools" of the Federal Reserve is "felt on bank balance sheets via
either short-term transactions involving Treasury Securities [high-grade collateral] or the
lending of reserves against high quality collateral." Id. The balance sheets of security firms
and other financial market entities, such central counterparties, have a much broader array
of assets, which are typically much riskier than those of traditional banking institutions. Be-
cause of the 1991 amendments, emergency discount window funding did not have to be
secured by the same types of collateral that commercial banks generally use to secure dis-
count window funding. See generally Walker F. Todd, FDICIA 's Emergency Liquidity Provisions,
ECON. REv., Q. III 1993, at 16-23, available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Review
/1993/93-q3-todd.pdf; see also Gordon & Muller, supra note 101, at 30-33.
131. David Fettig, TheHistory ofa Powerful Paragraph, THE REGION,June 2008, at 33, availa-
be at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/08-06/section13.pdf; see also Roberta S.
Karmel, An Orderly Liquidation Authority Is Not the Solution to Too-Big-to-Fail 5 (Brooklyn Law
School Legal Studies Research Papers Accepted Paper Series, Research Paper No. 259, 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2001639.
132. David Fettig, Lender of More Than Last Resort, THE REGION, Dec. 2002, at 15, 46, availa-
ble at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/02-12/lender.pdf.
133. Gordon & Muller, supra note 53, at 33.
134. See Title VIII of Dodd-Frank.
135. See generally MEHRLING, supra note 1, at 1-2. Note that Mehrling uses the term
"dealer" rather than "market-maker" of last resort. To see the use of both terms, see Marshall
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the market-based credit system. In addition, economists such as Wil-
lem Buiter and Anne Siebert argue that this role-also termed a
market-maker of last resort-"is a defining function of the modern
central bank."'13 6 As such, they claim, central banks such as the Fed-
eral Reserve must assume this role.137
Professor Steven Schwarcz has similarly advocated for the Federal
Reserve to assume the role of market liquidity provider of last re-
sort. 138 Proponents of this new role for the Federal Reserve argue
that this transformation is necessary in light of the changed nature
of credit intermediation or creation in the economy, which has
shifted from a largely banking-centered system to an increasingly
market-based system.
Proponents of this new last-resort role for the Federal Reserve
argue that provision of last-resort funding liquidity to traditional
depository institutions has been and is insufficient to address the
liquidity needs of modern financial markets. 139 This is because the
practical impact of Depression-era reforms such as Glass-Steagall's
separation of commercial and investment banking has been "to re-
strict the tools of the Fed to focus narrowly on commercial banks
and bank holding companies." 140 Banking and financial regulation,
however, has long lagged financial market innovation and change.
One example of this is that banking regulation, even post-Dodd-
Frank, has yet to fully embrace the reality that significant credit
creation occurs outside traditional banking institutions in the
market-based credit system.141
Auerback, The Central Bank As "Dealer of Last Resort?, NAKED CAPITALISM (Apr. 10, 2010), http:/
/www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/04/auerback-the-central-bank-as-%E2%80%9Cdealer-of-
the-last-resort%E2%80%9D.html (noting that "Mehrling's ultimate conclusion: [h]a[s] the
central Bank become 'Dealer of the Last Resort,' in effect backstopping the system by being
the ultimate market-maker or 'insurer of last resort' [?]").
136. See Willem Buiter & Anne Sibert, The Central Bank As the Market-Maker of Last Resort:
From Lender of Last Resort to Market-Maker of Last Resort, VOX (Aug. 13, 2007), http://
www.voxeu.org/index.php?qN-de/459.
137. Id. Note that legal scholars have largely been absent from the debate about the
proper normative scope of the Federal Reserve's last-resort role. An exception is Professor
Steven Schwarcz's work. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEo. LJ. 193, 225
(2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008326 (proposing a liquidity provider of last
resort).
138. See id.; see also Steven Schwarcz, Keynote Address: The Case for a Market Liquidity
Provider of Last Resort, in 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 339 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling
Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 Wis. L. REV. 815.
139. See generally Buiter & Sibert, supra note 136; see also Buiter, supra note 111.
140. KROSZNER & MELICK, supra note 91, at 3.
141. See generally Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, supra note 109. For example, the
authors note, "While Dodd-Frank takes some important steps in the regulation of shadow
banking there are still large gaps where it is (almost) silent." Id. at 1.
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Opponents of a new last-resort role for central banks have ar-
gued that "central banks should not rescue fools." 142 If central
banks act as market-makers of last resort, they risk "offering a com-
mitment to be buyers of last resort in a market for lemons, thereby
subsidizing the creation of a market in junk."1 43 The concern is that
market participants will know that in an emergency, they could po-
tentially sell or "put" such assets to the central bank, and that this
knowledge could impact the market's ex ante valuation or demand
for these assets. Assets that a central bank accepts to collateralize
emergency credit and liquidity assistance are ultimately more liquid
and valuable than those assets ineligible for this role. The potential
ability to "put" an assortment of financial market assets to the cen-
tral bank in financial crises in exchange for last-resort funding in-
troduces an important moral hazard, because this "put" potentially
acts as a form of insurance. Therefore, the market-maker of last
resort role creates a price floor for such assets.1 44 This essentially
catastrophic liquidity insurance inherently makes such assets more
liquid, which could impact asset pricing, as liquid financial assets
are more valuable than illiquid ones. Ultimately, market discipline
surrounding credit creation could be importantly impacted by the
presence of a market-maker of last resort. U.S. securities regulation
has traditionally been based on a disclosure-based rather than a
merit-based regulation paradigm. If, as market-makers of last resort,
central banks begin to accept a broad variety of collateral to secure
last-resort funding, then there is a risk that some of this collateral
might end up being unintelligible junk or toxic assets. To guard
against this risk, therefore, regulatory paradigms of securities mar-
kets might need to shift in the direction of merit-based systems;
"the properties of all the products these institutions invent" would
need to be regulated. 145 In fact, legal and economic scholarship is
increasingly discussing this general issue. For example, Professors
Eric Posner and Glen Weyl suggest the creation of an "FDA for Fi-
nancial Innovation."'146 Under this system, innovations in financial
142. Martin Wolf, Central Banks Should Not Rescue Fools, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d3db8c86-5564-1 ldc-b971-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz23N5OeMBN.
See generally Martin Wolf, Why the Credit Squeeze Is a Turning Point for the World, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/90126fca-a8lO-1ldc-9485-00O0779
fd2ac.html#axzz2BCHKaEC3.
143. Id.; see also Crockett, supra note 52, at 15.
144. MEHRLING, supra note 1, at 137.
145. Wolf, supra note 142.
146. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal for Limiting Speculation on Derivatives: An
FDA for Financial Innovation 1 (Univ. of Chi. Inst. for Law & Economics, Olin Research Paper
No. 594, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstract-id=1995077.
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derivative markets would require financial regulators' prior ap-
proval. 147 Somewhat similarly, Professors Gary Gorton and Andrew
Metrick suggest in Regulating the Shadow Banking System that finan-
cial regulators should supervise the securitization process by the
creation of "narrow funding banks" that would have access to the
Federal Reserve's discount window. 148 Only these "narrow funding
banks" would be allowed to buy securitized products. 149
Regardless of the proper balance between disclosure- and merit-
based regulation, Title VIII's new last-resort lending authority and
its consequent transformation of the Federal Reserve's last resort
role suggests that this issue should be thoughtfully revisited. Econo-
mists are debating the normative question of whether central banks
should act as market-makers of last resort. But as this Article argues,
Title VIII's practical effect is to settle this question in the
affirmative.
In sum, the idea of a central bank as market-maker of last resort
is controversial' 50 for at least four reasons. First, it means that finan-
cial markets ultimately cannot take care of themselves. Second, it
requires central banks to price private market securities and assets
in financial crises. Third, this role entails central banks potentially
buying private securities and financial assets to restore liquidity
when financial markets break down. Fourth, this role would essen-
tially entail central banks guaranteeing the market value of the fi-
nancial assets themselves151 by creating a price floor for these assets
by buying them. This last point is potentially problematic because
this guarantee could impact asset pricing-that is, the pricing of
financial market risk.
Financial markets' determination of an asset's price is impacted
by its liquidity. An asset's market liquidity is also potentially im-
pacted by anticipation of whether central bank last-resort financial
assistance is likely to be forthcoming in a crisis. 152 Andrew Crockett,
as President of JPMorgan Chase International, explained that
147. Id.
148. See GORTON & METRICK, supra note 141, at 21.
149. Id.
150. See Schooner and Taylor, supra note 43, at 56. (explaining that "[d]espite initial
concerns among central bankers that this course of action (acting as a market-maker of last
resort] violated a leading principle of central banking followed for over a century, during the
Great Financial Crisis, a number of central banks adopted this practice").
151. MEHRLING, supra note 1, at 134.
152. See, e.g., Todd, supra note 130, at 20 ("It is important to keep in mind that nonbanks'
behavior depends in part on how they expect the Federal Reserve to manage emergency
lending powers.").
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Since market participants generally acquire assets and liabili-
ties to trade, they will be particularly concerned about the con-
ditions under which they can on-sell assets, or can use them as
collateral for funding needs. They are, in other words,
concerned not only about fundamental long-term value, but
also about the value they can realize in circumstances under
which they need to liquidate a position quickly. This considera-
tion implies circularity in the concept of liquidity. An asset that is
perceived as liquid will be demanded for its liquidity characteristics.
But one that is perceived as lacking in liquidity will lose demand.1 53
Liquidity can be thought of as a financial institution's "survival
constraint."' 54 The financial crisis highlighted the critical impor-
tance of market liquidity and the profound systemic consequences
of its shortage. The financial crisis also "highlighted the lack of
sound liquidity risk management at financial institutions and the
need to address systemic liquidity risk."'155 Most importantly, the fi-
nancial crisis "suggest[ed] that liquidity has been significantly un-
derpriced.' '15 6 The presence of a market-maker of last resort could
exacerbate this practice.
What then is a market-maker of last resort, which provides last-
resort market liquidity, and how does it impact financial market li-
quidity? Market liquidity refers to a financial institution's ability to
"sell a financial instrument at short notice, subject to low
transaction costs and at a price close to its fundamental value."'157
While "funding liquidity" targets the liability side of a financial insti-
tution's balance sheet, market liquidity primarily impacts its asset
side.1 58 These different types of liquidity, however, are interre-
lated. 59 And as credit markets evolve, this liquidity "distinction...
is becoming less relevant."' 60 This evolution is one reason some sug-
gest that the Federal Reserve should provide an integrated last-
resort liquidity role.161
A market-maker of last resort can provide market liquidity in a
variety of ways: (1) by buying and selling a wide variety of private
153. Crockett, supra note 52, at 15 (emphasis added).
154. See supra note 53.
155. INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 59, at 75.
156. Martin Wolf, Why the Credit Squeeze is a Turning Point for the World, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2007, http://www.ft.com/ind/cms/s/0/90126fca-a810-11dc-9485-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz
23N50eMBN.
157. BUITER, supra note 104, at 16.
158. Id.
159. See generally MEHRLING, supra note 1, at 25-29.
160. Crockett, supra note 52, at 14.
161. See MEHRLING, supra note 1, at 10, 114.
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market securities and assets when financial markets freeze;16 2 (2) by
accepting a broad variety of collateral to secure discount window
funding;' 63 or (3) by using a broad variety of collateral in repur-
chase agreements.1 64 Market illiquidity is characteristic of disrup-
tions in the market-based credit system. 165 During the financial
crisis, the most important disruptions occurred in the market-based
credit system, which has become "a more important source of
credit than the traditional banking system." 166 The market-based
credit system or "shadow banking system includes familiar institu-
tions as investment banks, money-market mutual funds, and mort-
gage brokers; rather old contracts, such as sale and repurchase
agreements... and more esoteric instruments such as asset-backed
securities .. .collateralized-debt obligations ... ,and asset-backed
commercial paper."1 67
The traditional banking system has long had government back-
stops in place for systemic disruptions, including the Federal Re-
serve's lender-of-last-resort role and federal deposit insurance.
Regulation of traditional banking institutions protects against insol-
vency risk by mandated capital requirements and the provision of
federal deposit insurance.168 It manages liquidity risk by statutorily
mandated reserve requirements and the Federal Reserve's role as a
lender of last resort.169 The market-based credit system likewise con-
fronts-solvency and liquidity risk, but it has not been subject to com-
parable regulation or had the benefit of parallel, explicit
government backstops.
In the absence of government backstops, private markets devel-
oped backstops of their own for the market-based credit system.
These backstops included credit default swaps, which eventually as-
sumed a private "last-resort" stability role in the market-based credit
system.170 Private sector "liquidity and credit puts" such as credit
162. See Willem Buiter, The Central Bank As Market-Maker of Last Resort, FT.CoM (Aug. 12,
2007, 4:16 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2007/08/the-central-banhtml/#axzz29F5
IYNYf.
163. Id.
164. See id. See also Anne Sibert, Price Stability and the Lender of Last Resort, EUR. PAm PENT
(May 2008), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200803/20080312
ATT23932/20080312ATr23932EN.pdf (briefing paper for the Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs (ECON) of the European Parliament for the Quarterly Dialogue with the
President of the European Central Bank); see also Buiter, supra note 104; Buiter & Sibert,
supra note 136.
165. See Willem Buiter, supra note 111.
166. MEHRUTNC, supra note 1, at 113.
167. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 109, at 1.
168. MEHRLING, supra note 1, at 117.
169. Id. at 117-18.
170. Id.
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default swaps thus "underpinned the stability of the shadow bank-
ing system" before the financial crisis. 171 For example, in selling
nearly half a trillion dollars' worth of credit default swap protec-
tion, AIG was ultimately functioning as a private market-maker of
last resort. 172 Therefore, when "the Fed took over AIG's book of
credit derivatives in exchange for an 80 percent equity stake in the
company... the government acquired the CDS portfolio that had
been supporting the entire system." 173 Financial markets errone-
ously assumed all was well. But when AIG avoided catastrophic col-
lapse only due to the Federal Reserve's assistance, the inadequacy
of private market backstops in the market-based credit system be-
came abundantly clear. 174
Tragically, before the spectacular collapses and near-collapses in
the financial crisis, market participants failed to grasp the critical
importance of liquidity:
[T]he key mistake that [investment banks and insurance com-
panies] made was in not appreciating the liquidity dimension
of the system.., the investment banks and the insurance com-
panies were acting as suppliers of market liquidity. The
insurers thought they were insuring a low-probability risk,
whereas in fact they were acting as a private dealer of last re-
sort, selling market liquidity and at a price that proved to be
too generous.175
This reality is now alarmingly clear: market liquidity was, and ar-
guably will continue to be, underpriced and mismanaged in the
market-based credit system. Without the additional reforms pro-
posed in Part IV, the Federal Reserve's new last-resort lending role
could inadvertently further encourage additional mismanagement
and mispricing of market liquidity risk.
The next Part explains Title VIII's financial market utility re-
forms. As noted above, acting as a market-maker of last resort re-
quires a central bank to be able to accept a broad variety of
collateral to secure discount window assistance, to provide a pricing
floor for and buy private market assets, and to accept a broad range
of collateral in repo transactions. Once the practical impact of Title
171. ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., SHADOW BANKING 2 (2012), availa-
ble at http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff reports/sr458.pdf.
172. MEHRLING, supra note 1, at 132.
173. Id. at 132-33.
174. See generally MEHRLING, supra note 1.
175. Id. at 129-30.
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VIII is understood, it becomes clear that its reforms meet these re-
quirements. Title VIII has transformed the Federal Reserve's tradi-
tional lender-of-last-resort role to also include "market-maker" of
last resort.
II. CENTRAL CLEARING PARTIES AND TITLE VIII's REFORMS
Central clearing parties (CCPs) are at the heart of Title VIII's
financial market utility reforms. In fact, most of the financial mar-
ket utilities initially designated by the Financial Stability Oversight
Council as systemically significant-and therefore potentially eligi-
ble to benefit from Title VIII's last-resort lending assistance-are
CCPs. This Part first tells the story of CCPs and their importance in
financial markets, particularly their increasing significance in the
over-the-counter (OTC) derivative markets. It then introduces Title
VIII and the reforms it implements for certain financial market util-
ities, particularly systemically important CCPs.
In this context, this Part also examines the Federal Reserve's ex-
pansive new lending authority, and argues that Title VIII's reforms
fall short of implementing measures needed to minimize the moral
hazard and threats to the mispricing of risk that such reforms could
create.
A. Financial Market Plumbing and Central Clearing Parties
1. Financial Market Plumbing
Financial market utilities, operated both by the Federal Reserve
and the private sector, are at the heart of the "plumbing" of the
financial markets. 176 Payment, clearing, and settlement systems are
critical to the systemic stability of modern financial markets across
the globe. 177 Financial market utilities, such as CCPs, are part of the
infrastructure of these systems.
Payment, clearing, and settlement systems ensure that the details
of each trade are matched and confirmed, that counterparties
176. See generally DONNA NORDENBERG & MARC LABONTE, DODI-FRANK Acr, TiLE VIII:
SUPERVISION OF PAYMENT, CLEARING, AND SETrLEMENT ACTIVITIES (2010).
177. Id. at 3-11. On an average business day, over $13 trillion dollars of financial transac-
tions-including securities, derivatives, foreign exchange, and retail-are settled by these
systems. Id. at 1.
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make their requisite payments, and that performance on the finan-
cial contract ultimately occurs. Payment systems transfer funds elec-
tronically. Settlement systems finalize financial transactions
through "facilitat[ing] the settlement of transfers of funds or
financial transactions.' 7 And the time lag between execution of a
trade and its final settlement is referred to as the "clearing pro-
cess."1 79 Post-trade processes can occur through centralized finan-
cial market utilities, such as CCPs, or by operations processes within
individual financial institutions.8 0 The latter approach has tradi-
tionally been, and for now remains, prevalent in the bilaterally
traded OTC derivative markets and in the tri-party repo markets.'
But however this process happens, "[t]here is general consensus
that smoothly running and efficient post-trade services are a neces-
sary precondition for the efficient functioning of financial
markets."182
2. Central Clearing Parties (CCPs)
During the clearing period, "trades need to be processed, man-
aged, monitored and ultimately prepared for settlement.' ' 1 3 If indi-
vidual financial institutions do not handle the clearing process, it
becomes the job of CCPs. CCPs are a subset of clearinghouses,
which originally developed in the financial futures markets. 184 CCPs
178. NORDENBERG & LAoNrE, supra note 176, at 6. For a more in-depth discussion of
these systems, see id.
179. TINA P. HASENPUSCH, CLEARING SERVICES FOR GLOBAL MARKETS 2.1.2.1 (2009).
180. See Stephen G. CecchettiJacob Gyntelberg & Marc Hollanders, Central Counterparties
for Over-the-Counter Derivatives, BIS Q. REv., Sept. 2009, at 47-48, available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r-qt099f.pdf. These two possibilities for the completion of post-
trade processes are also evident in Dodd-Frank's Title VIII because it implements reforms
both for certain financial market utilities and for certain financial institutions engaged in
.payment, clearing, or settlement activity." See Dodd-Frank § 803(7).
181. Recent financial regulatory reforms, such as the mandates in Dodd-Frank's Title VII
that "standardized" over-the-counter derivatives be cleared through CCPs, aim to ensure that
in the future, the majority of the trades in these markets use centralized CCPs. It remains
unclear, however, what percentage of the over-the-counter derivative markets will actually use
centralized clearing facilities in the future. In the tri-party repo markets, two clearing banks
essentially act as default CCPs.
182. HASENPUSCH, supra note 179, at 2.
183. Id. at 18.
184. See generally Randall S. Kroszner, Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk ?: The
Development of Derivatives Clearinghouses and Recent Over-the-Counter Innovations, 31 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANRINGc 596 (1999). A derivative future is a financial contract in which parties
agree to do something in the future. For example, with an oil future contract, parties will
agree that one party, the buyer, will buy a certain amount of a certain type of oil at a specified
date in the future for a specified price. The counterparty, the seller, will be responsible for
the delivery of this oil at the specified time.
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that clear securities and derivatives transactions are among the
most significant types of CCPs. 18 5
CCPs provide a number of benefits, the most important of which
is the minimization of counterparty credit risk-the risk that one's
counterparty will default or become insolvent prior to completing
performance on the contract. Professor Randall S. Kroszner, a for-
mer Governor of the Federal Reserve System, suggests that a CCP
can be viewed as a private market contractual and organizational
innovation designed to ameliorate the problem of counterparty
credit risk. 186
The CCP, an ingenious response to counterparty credit risk, has
a long-standing, superb track record. CCPs' history of success re-
sults from a combination of novation and an elaborately designed
complex system of risk management. Through the legal process
known as "novation," the central clearing party effectively steps into
the middle of the financial transaction. It becomes the buyer to the
seller and the seller to the buyer. Upon completion of the novation
process, each original party to the trade remains exposed only to
the credit risk of the CCP.187 And CCP design and risk management
practices aim to make these entities rock-solid centers of credit risk
management.18
The credit strength of a CCP is based upon several layers of time-
tested, highly robust risk management practices. These layers of risk
management typically include requiring individual clearing mem-
bers to maintain margin accounts, i 9 mandating default fund
contributions, and ensuring avenues by which CCPs can access ad-
ditional funding 90 and then finally resort to the CCPs' own capi-
tal.191 Because a CCP is on both sides of a financial trade, its market
positions should net out. This means that a CCP's "market risk"-its
exposure to market price movements-should be neutral or flat.
A CCP is exposed to the credit risk of its counterparties, known
as "clearing members," for the duration of the payment, clearing,
185. NORDENBERC & l.,Nr, supra note 176, at 5.
186. See Kroszner, supra note 184, at 601-02.
187. Professors Skeel andJackson explain that a CCP "become[s] the true party in inter-
est in the event a counterparty fails"; it is "more than just a middleman." David A. Skeel,Jr. &
Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 CoLuM. L.
Rav. 152, 157 (2012).
188. See generally NoRmAN, supra note 21.
189. Margin accounts hold collateral to decrease the negative impact of a potential de-
fault by a clearing member on its contractual obligations. See id. at 9 (section beginning with
"Managing Risk").
190. See id. These avenues include, for example, credit lines or the ability to make addi-
tional financial assessments of the clearing members.
191. BaNK OF ENG., supra note 32, at 20.
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and settlement process of each financial transaction. Because the
length of the clearing process can be vastly different for securities,
derivatives, and repurchase agreements (repos), the risks involved
can be significantly different as well. For example, securities typi-
cally settle within three days once title is given to the buyer and
payment to the seller (known as "Delivery versus Payment") .192 Con-
sequently, CCPs involved in securities settlement are exposed
relatively briefly to the default risk of their counterparties. 19
On the other hand, the payment, clearing, and settlement pro-
cess for certain derivatives and repos can span days, months, years,
or even decades. 94 Consequently, the CCP faces long-term expo-
sure to the credit risk of each counterparty or clearing member.
Not surprisingly, therefore, "derivatives clearing systems have far
more complex risk management, margining, and collateral man-
agement systems."1 95
Because "it is more efficient to have one party collect the infor-
mation and monitor the other parties rather than having all parties
monitor each other,"196 CCPs also improve economic efficiency by
their ability to net the positions of clearinghouse members, reduce
transaction costs by centralizing post-trade processes, and promote
mutualized risk management. 197
As a neutral, third-party monitor, CCPs can also promote con-
tractual performance. 198 Improved netting decreases counterparty
credit risk and, in turn, reduces the amounts of margin that
clearinghouse members must maintain.1 99 Novation also promotes
trading anonymity, 200 which can potentially enhance market
liquidity.
Despite their track record of success, however, CCPs themselves
can be threatened in rare moments of extreme economic dis-
tress.29 1 Because of their intense concentration of credit risk, a dis-
tressed CCP is not equivalent to a typical troubled bank or financial
institution. International regulatory reform discussions have tended
to view CCPs as a panacea, but their potential collapse could be
192. John McPartland, Clearing and Settlement Demystiied, CH. FED LETrER, Jan. 2005, at 2,
available at http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/chicago-fed letter/2005/
january_210.cfm.
193. Id.
194. HASENPUSCH, supra note 179, at 18.
195. McPartland, supra note 192, at 2.
196. HASENPUSCH, supra note 179, at 45.
197. Id.
198. See Nosal, supra note 16, at 137.
199. See NORMAN, supra note 21, at 15 (section 2.6, "Netting Trades and Open Interest").
200. HAsENPUSCiH, supra note 179, at 24.
201. See Bernanke, supra note 33.
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"the financial equivalent of Chernobyl. '" 20 2 It is important to re-
member that CCPs are not fail- proof financial market entities .2 3 As
Professor John Coffee has noted, "[f] ew scenarios for financial
destabilization are more frightening (or more plausible) than the
prospect of a clearinghouse's failure."2 0 4
The CCP depends upon the performance of each clearinghouse
member to assist in its completion of its own obligations. If a CCP
failed to perform its obligations, it would almost certainly trigger
additional clearinghouse member defaults. Consequently, a CCP
could rapidly experience serious liquidity or solvency issues if it
were sufficiently impacted by the default of a significantly large
clearinghouse member or by the default of multiple clearing
members.
CCPs could also become distressed or fail for additional reasons,
such as "the default of an investment counterparty; business risk;
the default of a payment bank; and the risk of extended operational
disruption."20 5 Moreover, many of the clearinghouse members at
significant derivative market CCPs are also too-big-to-fail financial
institutions and banks, whose distress would send serious systemic
shocks into the banking system. 20 6
Nevertheless, the CCP's robust track record of success, even in
the absence of explicit, direct access to liquidity from the Federal
Reserve, can be attributed to the complex, multi-tiered layers of risk
management that mutualize default risk among clearinghouse
members. Because of traditional CCP risk sharing practices,
clearinghouse members have historically been mutually responsible
202. Press Release, Comm. on Capital Markets Regulation, Hal Scott Releases Letter to
CFTC Chairman Gensler Urging Major Federal Reserve Input to CFTC Rules on Conflicts of
Interest in Derivatives Clearinghouses (Sept. 5, 2010), available at http://capmktsreg.org/
2010/09/gensler-letter-on-conficts-of-interest-in-derivatives-clearinghouses/ (quoting Hal
Scott).
203. BANK OF ENG., supra note 32, at 21. The report also noted that
[t]he likely impact of CCP distress or failure is greater now than in the past due to the
expansion of central clearing to new products and markets. So robust arrangements
are needed for managing losses while maintaining the continuity of clearing services.
Most CCPs do not, however, have proven arrangements for managing losses that ex-
ceed their margin and other financial resources.
Id. at 52.
204. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 845 (2011).
205. BANK OF ENG., supra note 32, at 20. It is important to note that the European debt
crisis has especially highlighted the risk involved in CCPs reinvesting resources such as a
clearing members margin and default funds. Id.
206. Chairman Bernanke explains that "the same globally active banks participate in all of the
major clearinghouses, and the major clearinghouses often rely on similar sets of banks for payment ser-
vices, funding, settlement, and emergency liquidity." Bernanke, supra note 33 (emphasis added).
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for-or essentially required to fully internalize-their own risk-tak-
ing activities and those of their clients and other clearinghouse
members. This shared financial responsibility creates important in-
centives for robust mutual monitoring. 2 7 As discussed below, Title
VIII's new last-resort lending authority risks weakening this private
market risk mutualization, which could potentially impose signifi-
cant costs on the public.
If a clearinghouse member defaults, a CCP should first use the
defaulting member's margin to cover its obligations and attempt to
sell the defaulting member's portfolio.20 8 However, this sale could
take time depending upon the content of the defaulting members
portfolio.2 0 9 Nevertheless, the CCP will be depending upon the de-
faulting member's payment to fulfill its own time sensitive obliga-
tions. Therefore, if the defaulting member's margin account is
insufficient to cover this amount, the CCP will need to access
additional layers of its risk management protections2 10 or have alter-
native access to liquidity.211 The CCP's risk management protocol
will likely include a default or guarantee fund composed of already
paid-in contributions by its clearing members212 for use in such situ-
ations. Because this fund is composed of contributions by all clear-
ing members, it "mutualizes" among all clearing members the risk
of one clearing member's default.2 13 This risk mutualization has
been a traditional strength of CCPs because it creates an economic
incentive for clearinghouse members to monitor each other.21 4 The
CCP might also have access to other credit lines.2 15 It could also
have the ability to make assessments on non-defaulting clearing
members for additional funds.216 This latter option, however, could
prove problematic, especially in the case of systemically significant
CCPs. First, this assessment could take time, and time sensitive pay-
ments might need to be made. Second, the CCP is unlikely to make
additional emergency assessments of its clearinghouse members if
207. See, e.g., Kroszner, supra note 184, at 603 (discussing the structure of the Board of
Trade Clearing Corporation).
208. See generally Nosal, supra note 16.
209, Id.
210. See generally id.
211. See generally Gecchetti, Gyntelberg, and Hollanders (noting that "[k]eeping a CCP
liquid in the face of the failure of one or more participants requires that liquidity be available
somewhere." at 55)
212. See Nosal, supra note 16.
213. See id.
214. See generally James T. Moser, What is Multilateral Clearing and Who Cares?, CHI. FED
LETTER, no. 87 (Nov. 1994), available at http://qa.chicagofed.org/digitaLassets/publications
/chicago-fed-letter/1994/cflnovemberl994_87.pdf.
215. See Norman, supra note 21, at 10. See also PHmuiP WooD, supra note 38.
216. See Nosal, supra note 16.
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such assessments would then put these clearinghouse members at
risk of default. As noted above, many of these clearinghouse mem-
bers will likely themselves be too-big-to-fail financial institutions.
Therefore, a systemically significant CCP's sudden, but critical
emergency credit or liquidity need would create a critical systemic
risk.217 Finally, a CCP has its own capital.218
Importantly, if the CCP were to fail to make scheduled payments,
this would risk triggering additional clearinghouse member
defaults and further systemic liquidity problems. 2 19 Therefore, it is
imperative that a CCP have timely access to the liquidity it needs to
settle all schedule payments. 220 The Federal Reserve's new last-re-
sort lending authority is designed to potentially intervene in exactly
this type of circumstance to prevent the materialization of systemic
risk and, therefore, potentially great damage to financial markets
and the larger economy. Whether a CCP would need to work
through all of its risk management layers and/or declare insolvency
before receiving the Federal Reserve's assistance is unclear from Ti-
tle VIII.221 This is one reason that the creation of policies and pro-
cedures for using this last resort lending authority-discussed in
Part VI-is critical. In extreme but plausible market conditions, the
Federal Reserve arguably might need to essentially "buy" the portfo-
lio of a defaulting clearing member in exchange for last resort
funding to ensure contractual performance (ultimately the role of
the CCP itself) if the defaulting clearing member's portfolio cannot
be quickly sold at a commercially reasonable price to market par-
ticipants. 22 2 This risk could be especially high for portfolios of
highly specialized OTC derivatives. 22 3 Ideally, such portfolios would
217. See generally Anna L. Paulson & Kirstin E. Wells, Enhancing Financial Stability: The Case
of Financial Market Utilities, Cm. FED LErrER, Oct. 2005, available at http://www.chicagofed
.org/digital-assets/publications/chicagofed_letter/2010/cfloctober2OlO_279.pdf.
218. See Norman, supra note 21, at 10.
219. See Paulson & Wells, supra note 217, at 1.
220. See id. at 3.
221. See Christian Chamorro-Courfland, The Trillion Dollar Question: Can a Central Bank
Bail Out a Central Counterparty Clearing House Which is "Too Big To Fail"?, 6 BROOK.J. CoRP. FIN.
& CoM. L. 433, 464 (2012).
222. This argument is plausible in light of market conditions and the Federal Reserve's
actions in the recent financial crisis, particularly its loan/purchase surrounding Bear Steams
assets and its equity stake in AIG. Similar issues, concerns, and risks could arise in the case of
a systemically important CCP.
223. This is suggested because
specialized OTC derivative contracts are much less liquid because their estimated
value is subject to great variation and they are traded on a bi-lateral basis. Hence, it
may be difficult to sell a large position of OTC contracts on short notice at a price that
is at or near its estimated value.
Nosal, supra note 16, at 142.
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consist of high quality, valuable assets, but the fundamental con-
cern of those opposed to a market-maker of last resort is that in
some cases, such portfolios might also contain toxic junk.
B. Title VII
1. Background and Purpose
Title VIII is merely one of sixteen titles in the monumental and
historic Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, which Congress passed in July 2010.224 Condensed from two-
thousand-plus pages to a mere 848, Dodd-Frank's stated purpose is
"[t] o promote the financial stability of the United States by improv-
ing accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end
'too big to fail,' to protect the American taxpayer by ending
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services prac-
tices, and for other purposes."225
At a mere twenty pages, Title VIII is short and sweet, but it packs
a transformative regulatory punchy 26 The objectives of Title VIII's
financial market utility reforms are listed in Section 802, "Findings
and Purposes" of Title VIII. First, it provides the Federal Reserve
with the explicit statutory authority to promote uniform risk man-
agement standards and their supervision both for financial institu-
tions engaged in critical payment, clearing, and settlement activities
and for systemically significant financial market utilities. 227 Many
foreign central banks have long had clear supervisory authority over
these systems. 228 International banking regulators view supervision
of payment, clearing, and settlement systems as a "core responsibil-
ity of central banks. '229 In contrast, prior to Title VIII's enactment,
224. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter "Dodd-Frank"].
225. Preamble, 124 Stat. at 1376.
226. Title VIII's findings note that "[e]nhancements to the regulation and supervision of
systemically important financial market utilities and the conduct of systemically important
payment, clearing, and settlement activities by financial institutions are necessary" to "pro-
vide consistency," "to promote robust risk management and safety and soundness," "to
reduce systemic risks," and "to support the stability of the broader financial system." Dodd-
Frank § 802 (a) (4).
227. See § 802 (findings and purposes of Dodd-Frank's Title VIII).
228. See NORDENBERG & LAtoNTE, supra note 176, at 15.
229. Id. Central banks are especially concerned with clearing systems: "Firstly, CCPs can
enhance financial stability when they are working properly. Secondly, links between CCPs
operating in different countries can foster financial integration across borders. Thirdly, be-
cause clearing houses use payment systems and other infrastructures operated by central
banks to carry out their activities . .. ." HASENPUSCH, supra note 179, at 58.
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the Federal Reserve had to rely upon a "patchwork of authorities,
largely derived from [its] role as a banking supervisor, as well as on
moral suasion."230 As a result of Title VIII, however, the Federal Re-
serve now has enhanced statutory authority over these critical finan-
cial market systems. Second, it aims to strengthen "the liquidity of
systemically important financial market utilities."231
2. Critical Definitions and Designations
Despite the brevity of its text, Title VIII's foundational definitions
and concepts are highly expansive and its application is far-reach-
ing. Accordingly, this subpart reviews several critical definitions and
concepts such as "financial market utility," "financial transaction,"
and "systemic importance" to illustrate the expansive impact and
importance of Title VIII.
For example, Title VIII defines a financial market utility as "any
person that manages or operates a multilateral system for the pur-
pose of transferring, clearing, or settling payments, securities, or
other financial transactions among financial institutions or between
financial institutions and the person.'" 232 This definition clearly in-
cludes financial market utilities such as CCPs.2 3 3 Because this defini-
tion is potentially expansive, it may also include financial
institutions such as dealer banks in the OTC derivative markets and
the two clearing banks in the tri-party repo markets2 - 4 to the extent
that they perform certain payment, clearing, and settlement activi-
ties.2 35 For example, if bilateral counterparties do not use a CCP to
230. Systemic Risks and the Financial Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., I10th
Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg44900/
pdf/CHRG-110hhrg44900.pdf.
231. Dodd-Frank § 802(b)(3).
232. § 803(6)(A).
233. The majority of the eight entities recently designated by the Financial Stability Over-
sight Council are clearinghouses. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 35.
234. Note that banks, brokers, clearinghouses, and CCPs can all be involved in the clear-
ing process. See HASENPUSCH, supra note 179, at 33.
235. My interpretation of the definition of "financial market utility" as including an indi-
vidual financial institution other than what might explicitly be thought of as a "financial
market utility," such as a specific central clearing party, is reasonable based upon the exclu-
sion of individual financial institutions-such as a broker or dealer-from the definition of
"financial market utility" to the extent they are acting in certain, limited capacities. SeeDodd-
Frank § 803(6)(B) (ii). This exclusion would be unnecessary if it were clear that an individual
financial institution such as a broker or dealer-financial institutions mentioned within this
exclusion-could not possibly fall within the definition of "financial market utility." The im-
plication of this exclusion seems clearly to be that these individual institutions, if engaged in
payment, settlement, or clearing activity or "critical risk management or processing
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clear their OTC derivatives, then the transferring, clearing, and set-
tlement of these transactions could occur within and between the
financial institutions themselves. 236 This would potentially enable a
systemically important group of individual financial institutions to
fit within Title VIII's definition of a "financial market utility." The
definition of "financial market utility" is a critical concept because
only "systemically significant" ones - as designated by the Financial
Stability Oversight Council - can potentially be assisted by Title
VIII's new last resort credit and liquidity authority. Consequently,
Congress in Dodd-Frank has arguably granted the Federal Reserve
the legal authority to assist an individual distressed nonbank finan-
cial institution in very limited, but possible, circumstances.
Another critical and expansive concept in Title VIII is "financial
transaction."2 3 7 Because Title VIII leaves the term undefined, "fi-
nancial transaction" potentially includes any private market security
or financial asset in existence now or created in the future. As a
Congressional Research Service Report explains,
In the future, new and evolving types of financial products,
transactions and instruments could lead to new payment,
clearing, and settlement systems and activities. It is notable
that Title VIII does not consolidate or centralize authority for
the approval of the formation of new utilities or PCS [pay-
ment, clearing, or settlement] activities within the Federal Re-
serve or any single regulatory agency. 238
Consequently, Title VIII's financial market utility reforms could
in the long run be relevant to a wide variety of future CCPs, finan-
cial market transactions, or payment, clearing, and settlement activ-
ities potentially even within individual financial institutions.2 3 9
functions" could potentially qualify as a designated "financial market utility." See generally
Dodd-Frank § 803(6) (B) (ii).
236. See supra note 180.
237. The term "financial transaction" is only defined within and specific to the definition
of "payment, clearing, or settlement activity" in Section 803(7)(b). See Dodd-Frank
§ 803(7) (b). The only specific exclusions from the definition of "financial transaction" are
found in Section 803(6) (B). See § 803(6) (B).
238. NORDENBERG & LAsONTE, supra note 176, at 7.
239. For example, the reforms could be relevant for CCPs created to clear highly risky
OTC derivatives, "repos," or other types of financial assets. Note that the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York solicited comments regarding whether "implementation of a central
counterparty [would] be desirable in this [the tri-party repo] market." See THE FED. RESERVE
BANK OF N.Y., Tm-PARTY REpO INFRASThUcTURE REFoRm 19 (2010), available at http://
www.newyorkfed.org/banking/nyfrb-triparty.whitepaper.pdf.
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"Systemic importance," is yet another key concept because Title
VIII's financial market utility mandates only apply to entities so des-
ignated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council.2 40 In essence,
"systemically important"241 financial market utilities are those whose
distress risks triggering serious credit or liquidity disruptions in fi-
nancial market plumbing, potentially creating catastrophic finan-
cial market instabilities. 242  However, in defining this critical
concept, Title VIII's language is highly expansive, providing a
broad list of factors for the Council to consider in making such des-
ignations, including the sums involved, the aggregate risk expo-
sures, interdependencies, and potential negative externalities, as
well as "[a] ny other factors that the Council deems appropriate.."2 41
Designating a financial market utility as "systemically important"
generally requires the Council to provide advance notice to the fi-
nancial market utility and an opportunity for a hearing.2 44 Title VIII
waives this advance notice requirement in emergency circum-
stances, provided that at least two-thirds of the Council members,
including the Secretary of the Treasury, vote for this designation. 2 ,
The importance of the possibility of an emergency designation is
240. The Financial Stability Oversight Council (Council) is responsible for designating
financial market utilities that are "systemically important" or of "systemic importance" via a
prescribed voting procedure. See Authority to Designate Financial Market Utilities as System-
ically Important, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,763, 44,763-76 (July 27, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
ch. 13 and pt. 1320), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-07-27/pdf/2011-
18948.pdf. The Council very recently made its first such designations and termed eight finan-
cial market utilities as "systemically important." See Press Release, Dep't of the Treasury, Fi-
nancial Stability Oversight Council Makes First Designations in Effort to Protect Against
Future Financial Crisis (July 18, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-centerl
press-releases/Pages/tgl645.aspx.
241. Dodd-Frank defines both terms-"systemically important" and "systemic impor-
tance"-as
a situation where the failure of or a disruption to the functioning of a financial market
utility or the conduct of a payment, clearing, or settlement activity could create, or
increase, the risk of significant liquidity or credit problems spreading among financial
institutions or markets and thereby threaten the stability of the financial system of the
United States.
Dodd-Frank § 803(9).
242. See § 804(a)-(b) (requiring "a vote of not fewer than 2/3 of members then serving
[on the Council], including an affirmative vote by the Chairperson of the Council [the U.S.
Treasury Secretary]" for this designation or its rescission). Note that Dodd-Frank also pro-
vides a procedure for emergency designations. § 804(c) (3). Additionally, Title VIII also pro-
vides opportunities for consultation, notice, and hearing in regard to such designation. See
§ 804(c).
243. § 804(a) (2). Before designating a financial market utility as "systemically important,"
the Council must generally provide for advance notice and an opportunity for hearing.
§ 804(c).
244. Dodd-Frank § 804(c)(1)-(2).
245. § 804(c)(3).
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that during a financial crisis, financial market utilities such as CCPs
or potentially even individual financial institutions not previously
designated as "systemically important" (and, therefore, not subject
to heightened regulatory supervision as a result of such designa-
tion) could receive Title VIII's last resort lending assistance (emer-
gency credit and liquidity) without first incurring its burdens
(additional supervision and regulation) although they should be
regulated accordingly in the future.
3. Supervision and Risk Mangement
A key purpose of Title VIII is to grant financial regulators-the
CFTC, SEC, and the Federal Reserve 246-authority to prescribe risk
management standards for and enhanced supervisory authority
over designated financial market utilities and payment, clearing,
and settlement activities. 247 Section 805 of Dodd-Frank provides
both the "objectives and principles" of such supervision: (1) pro-
mote robust risk management; (2) promote safety and soundness;
(3) reduce systemic risks; and (4) support the stability of the
broader financial system. 248 The "scope" of such standards is exten-
sive, encompassing considerations such as "risk management poli-
cies and procedures, '249  "capital and financial resource
requirements for designated financial market utilities,"'250 and even
including "other areas that are necessary to achieve the [aforemen-
tioned] objectives and principles. '251
Title VIII mandates that designated financial market utilities
comply with the risk management standards set by the financial reg-
ulators. 252 The Federal Reserve recently approved a final rule "es-
tablishing risk-management standards for certain financial market
utilities (FMUs) designated as systemically important. '" 253
246. This responsibility will lie in the first instance with the financial regulator primarily
responsible for such entity's supervision.
247. See §§ 805, 807.
248. § 805(b).
249. § 805(c)(1).
250. § 805(c) (5).
251. Dodd-Frank § 805(c)(6).
252. § 805(f).
253. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve System
Announces Final Rule Establishing Risk-Management Standards for Financial Market Utili-
ties (FMUs) Designated as Systemically Important by the Financial Stability Oversight Coun-
cil (July 30, 2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/
20120730a.htm.
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4. The Federal Reserve's New Last-Resort Lending Authority
Section 806 of Title VIII contains several critical new legal
changes that significantly expand the explicit reach of the federal
safety net. First, the Federal Reserve is now authorized to provide
certain services such as Fedwire to designated financial market
utilities. 254
Second, the Federal Reserve "may authorize a Federal Reserve
Bank to establish and maintain an account for a designated finan-
cial market utility."255 At the Federal Reserve's discretion, any ac-
count balances held by a designated financial market utility in a
Federal Reserve Bank (Reserve Bank) are eligible to receive "earn-
ings on balances ... in the same manner and to the same extent as
. ..a depository institution. '" 256 But the Federal Reserve can also
exempt these accounts from the mandated reserve requirements
applicable by statute to all depository institutions. 257 Account and
payment services for financial market utilities represent a "substan-
tial change from current law, which restricts the use of Reserve
Bank accounts and payments services to depository institutions. .
and certain other institutions. '" 25 These changes largely harmonize
the U.S. system with international standards. 259 As argued in Part
IV, mandated reserves or some type of collateral requirements
should also be applicable to designated financial market utilities.
Third, and perhaps most critically, Section 806 grants the Fed-
eral Reserve the authority to provide credit or liquidity assistance
(i.e., to provide last resort lending) to designated financial market
utilities in "unusual or exigent circumstances. '" 26 Before providing
this assistance, the Federal Reserve must: 1) consult with the Trea-
sury Department, 2) obtain approval by the majority of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve, and 3) find that the financial
market utility "is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations
254. Dodd-Frank § 806(a). The relevant services are delineated in 12 U.S.C.A. § 248a(b)
(West 2012).
255. Dodd-Frank § 806(a).
256. § 806(c).
257. § 806(d).
258. Paulson and Wells, supra note 217, at 2 n.8.
259. See id. at 3. The authors explain that " [a] system of settlement through central bank
accounts to eliminate credit or liquidity risk is in line with international standards set by the
Bank for International Settlements and the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions and recent recommendations from the International Monetary Fund." Id.
260. Dodd-Frank Section 806(b).
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from other banking institutions. '" 261 Additionally, the Board of Gov-
ernors may create any "other limitations, restrictions, and regula-
tions"2 62 that it deems appropriate.
Title VIII does not define what constitutes such "unusual or exi-
gent" circumstances. Given the robust history and systemic impor-
tance of CCPs, almost any type of financial disruption or distress
could arguably constitute at least an "unusual," if not "exigent"
circumstance-in other words, any circumstance other than busi-
ness as usual. By describing the requisite circumstances required to
trigger Title VIII's last resort lending disjunctively, using "or" rather
than "and" ("unusual or exigent circumstances"), the statutory text
permits a potentially expansive interpretation of what constitutes
the requisite circumstances. This effect is underscored by the fact
that when the words "unusual" and "exigent" are used together
elsewhere in banking regulation, such as in the Federal Reserve's
13(3) emergency statutory authority discussed above, they are in-
stead generally joined by the conjunctive "and. '263
Senate draft financial reform proposals suggested providing
"CCPs with routine access to the Federal Reserve's discount win-
dow."26 4 Title VIII's use of the disjunctive "or" rather than "and"
suggests that Dodd-Frank somewhat moves in the direction of im-
plementing this objective.26 5 A contribution of this Article is to
261. Id. ("The Board of Governors may authorize a Federal Reserve Bank... to provide
to a designated financial market utility discount and borrowing privileges only in unusual or
exigent circumstances, upon the affirmative vote of a majority of the Board of Governors
then serving ... after consultation with the [Treasury] Secretary, and upon a showing by the
designated financial market utility that it is unable to secure adequate credit accommoda-
tions from other banking institutions."). In the event that a reduced number of the members
of the Board of Governors are available to vote, then 12 U.S.C, § 5465(b) directs that voting
procedures in 12 U.S.C. § 248(r) be followed. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5465(b) (West 2012).
262. Dodd-Frank § 806(b).
263. The phrase "unusual and exigent" is used in 12 U.S.C. §§ 248, 343, 355 (2006). The
phrase "unusual or exigent" is used in 12 U.S.C § 5465(b), which is Title VIII's new emer-
gency authority. See 12 U.S.C. § 5465(b). Note that 12 U.S.C. § 5612 ("Emergency financial
stabilization") uses the language "unusual and significant," 12 USC §1820 (administration of
FDIC) uses the language "emergency or under other exigent circumstances," 12 USC
§ 1715z-9 ("Co-insurance of eligible mortgage, advance, or loans") uses the language "unu-
sual or catastrophic," and 12 U.S.C. § 1795 (definitions relevant to a central liquidity facility
in context of credit unions) uses the language "unusual or emergency."
264. SeeJeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swap Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: Why Centralized
Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 49, 88 (2011).
265. As noted, use of Title VIII's last resort lending assistance does require consultation
with the U.S. Treasury, a requisite vote by the Board of Governors, and a finding that market
alternatives are not available. Dodd-Frank Section 806(b). These prerequisites do not apply
to depository institutions with routine access to the Federal Reserve's discount window. On
the other hand, routine access by depository institutions to the Federal Reserve's discount
window does not entail the transparency and accountability requirements now made applica-
ble by Dodd-Frank in the use of the Federal Reserve's 13(3) emergency power, but not in the
use of the Federal Reserve's Dodd-Frank Title VIII lending authority. To the extent that Title
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highlight Title ViII's use of the textual disjunction and to argue
that, as a result, Title VIII's new last resort lending authority could
grant designated financial market utilities such as CCPs non-emer-
gency access to the Federal Reserve's discount window (assuming
that all of the other prerequisites to its use, which were noted
above, were met).
Another reason that Title VIII somewhat inches in the direction
of providing bank-like discount window access to certain financial
market utilities is because the statutory text authorizes the Federal
Reserve "to provide . . . discount and borrowing privileges only in
unusual or exigent circumstances" under "section lOB of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 347b)."2 6 6 The statutory text further
states that "[a] cess to discount and borrowing privileges under sec-
tion lOB of the Federal Reserve Act as authorized in this section
does not require a designated financial market utility to be or be-
come a bank or bank holding company."267 Section lOB generally
addresses "[a] dvances to individual member banks."268, In contrast,
the statutory text of the Federal Reserve's 13(3) emergency author-
ity uses the word "discount, '"2 69 but not "privileges." And it refers
only to "section 14, subdivision (d)"27° of the Federal Reserve Act,
not to section 10B. When the differences noted above between the
Federal Reserve's 13(3) emergency power and its new Title VIII last
resort lending authority are combined with 1) the possibility of des-
ignated financial market utilities having accounts at the Federal Re-
serve and of using certain Federal Reserve services, 2) the possibility
of such accounts receiving "earnings on balances" as in the case of
depository institutions, and 3) the possibility of being exempted
from reserve requirements applicable to all depository institutions,
Title VIlI's last resort lending authority appears to lie somewhere
between the Federal Reserve's 13(3) emergency authority and de-
pository institution access to the discount window. Finally, unlike in
the case of its 13(3) emergency authority, the Federal Reserve will
already have some supervisory and enforcement powers ex-ante-in
VIII also does not entail such transparency and accountability mandates, the Federal Re-
serve's new Title VIII last-resort lending authority seems to occupy a hybrid position between
routine discount window access and the Federal Reserve's 13(3) emergency authority.
266. § 806(b).
267. Id.
268. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 347b (West 2012), which is entitled "Advances to individual mem-
ber banks on time or demand notes; maturities; time notes secured by mortgage loans cover-
ing one to four family residences."
269. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 343 (West 2012). Section 14, subsection (d) is entitled "Establish-
ment of rates of discount."
270. See 12 U.S.CA. § 343 (West 2012).
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the absence of an emergency designation-over designated finan-
cial market utilities.27' All of these considerations also strengthen
the argument in Part III that Title VIII's new last-resort lending au-
thority transforms the Federal Reserve's last-resort role. 272
Finally, an ambiguity in Title VIII's new last resort lending au-
thority is its potential conflict with Section 716 of Dodd-Frank. Sec-
tion 716 prohibits Federal assistance "to any swaps entity with
respect to any swap, security-based swap, or other activity of the
swaps entity."273 However, Title VIII seems to allow for the possibil-
ity of Federal assistance to a financial institution that could poten-
tially be categorized as both a "financial market utility" and as a
"swaps entity." Congress should clarify this ambiguity.
In sum, when Title VIII's new last-resort lending authority is com-
bined with its related extension of Fedwire and account services to
designated financial market utilities, these changes constitute a po-
tentially significant, explicit expansion of the federal safety net.
This expansion could significantly increase potential moral hazard
in the financial system, 274 which could in turn distort the pricing of
financial risk, lead to excessive risk-taking, and eventually culminate
in another financial crisis.
As CCPs and their robust risk management practices evolved in
part to protect against the materialization of "tail risk"-the small
probability of a potentially catastrophic occurrence 275-it is impera-
tive that the moral hazard incentives introduced by this new poten-
tial government backstop not reverse the lauded history of CCP risk
management practices. This is particularly important in regard to
their long-standing practice of mutualization of risk among clearing
members, which promotes strong mutual monitoring incentives
among clearing members. Thus, additional reforms, such as those
proposed in Part IV, are needed to minimize this risk.
271. See generally Dodd-Frank §§ 805, 807.
272. Dodd-Frank § 806(b).
273. § 716(a).
274. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has remarked in a speech that "[a]s is well
understood, the existence of emergency credit facilities for financial market utilities could
give rise to moral hazard (for example, in the form of insufficient attention by clearing-
houses to establishment of private-sector liquidity arrangements in advance of a crisis)."
Bernanke, supra note 33.
275. Tail risk is the risk that AIG was insuring by selling credit protection via credit de-
fault swaps to the market-based credit system. See generally RAJAN, supra note 45, at ch. 7.
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5. Examination and Enforcement Authority
Title VIII also provides financial regulators276 with heightened
examination and enforcement authority over designated financial
market utilities and accords emergency enforcement powers to the
Federal Reserve.2 77 Many of these supervisory, regulatory, and en-
forcement authorities resemble those the Federal Reserve has in
regard to certain banking institutions. This section also delineates
procedures financial market utilities must follow should they wish
to make any "changes to rules, procedures, or operations," includ-
ing in emergency circumstances. 278 The purpose of this additional
authority is to provide regulators with the ability to ensure that des-
ignated financial market utilities are strictly adhering to robust risk
management practices. Compliance with these exacting standards is
essential to minimizing the moral hazard that could result from Ti-
tle VIII's expansion of the federal safety net.
Title VIII also grants the Financial Stability Oversight Council the
authority to request information, reports, and records from desig-
nated financial market utilities.279 It also permits the dissemination
of "confidential supervisory information and other information ob-
tained under" Title VIII to a variety of domestic and international
regulators-including foreign finance ministers-if deemed appro-
priate and "reasonable assurances" of confidentiality are made by
the recipients of this informationY.t ' Finally, Title VIII exempts
such confidential supervisory information and also "any materials
prepared by the Board of Governors, the Supervisory Agencies, or
the Council regarding their assessment of the systemic importance
of financial market utilities" from disclosure under 12 USC § 552,
the Freedom of Information Act.28 '
276. The financial regulators involved here are the Commodities Futures Trade Commis-
sion (CFTC), the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Federal Reserve. Some
designated financial market utilities will be registered with the CFTC, others with the SEC,
and if registered with neither of these two, then the Federal Reserve will be its primary super-
visor. See Dodd-Frank §§ 803(8), 805. In such cases, the Federal Reserve will primarily play a
back-up supervisory role. See Dodd-Frank §808(e).
277. Dodd-Frank § 807(f).
278. § 806(e).
279. § 809(a)(1).
280. § 809(e).
281. § 8 0 9(g).
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6. Summary
Through Dodd-Frank's Title VIII, Congress has implemented
several important legal changes regarding financial market utilities.
In addition to providing financial regulators with new supervisory,
examination, and enforcement powers, it grants the Federal Re-
serve the authority to provide account services, Fedwire, and possi-
bly last resort lending to financial entities designated as systemically
significant financial market utilities by the Financial Stability
Oversight Council. These changes significantly expand the explicit
scope of the federal safety net.
In sum, Title VIII implements many measures to promote finan-
cial market stability. Absent from Title VIII, however, are reform
measures sufficient to minimize the potential moral hazard and
mispricing of financial risk that could be created by these stability-
oriented reforms. Title VIII does not mandate that designated fi-
nancial market utilities, such as systemically significant CCPs, make
any type of insurance payment or pay a risk premium for the
potential catastrophic insurance assistance Title VIII could provide
such institutions. Nor does Title VIIII restrict the types of financial
market transactions that systemically significant financial market
utilities may clear. It also lacks any provisions that require the valua-
tion of, or that place restrictions on, the types of collateral accept-
able to secure Title VIII's credit and liquidity assistance, except that
it be "secured to the satisfaction of'28 2 the Federal Reserve. Moreo-
ver, Title VIII does not implement sufficient transparency or ac-
countability measures to accompany its use.
III. T1E FEDERAL RESERVE As MARKET-MAKER OF LAST RESORT
The purpose of this Part is to argue that through Title VIII's
grant of a new last resort lending authority to the Federal Reserve,
Congress has permanently transformed the Federal Reserve's last-
resort role to not only include lender of last resort, but also to in-
clude market-maker of last resort.2 3 First, Title VIII's last resort
282. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 347b (West 2012).
283. In 2009, Willem Buiter wrote, "In view of the problems created by the opaque over-
the-counter markets in certain kinds of derivatives (e.g., credit default swaps (CDS)), central-
ized trading platforms, perhaps with a market-maker of last resort, and with transparent
clearing, settlement and custodial services-providing rules and arrangements will have to be
created for many of these derivatives." Willem Buiter, Too Big to Fail Is Too Big, WILLEM
BuITER'S MAVERECON (June 24, 2009, 3:03 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/06/
too-big-to-fail-is-too-big/#axzz23NUpEPZN. Trading platforms have no need of a market-
maker of last resort. It is the clearing of these trades via central clearing parties that seems to
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lending authority potentially institutionalizes the Federal Reserve's
rescue and backstop of AIG, an institution which assumed a pre-
crisis role of private market-maker of last resort in the market-based
credit system. 284 In rescuing AIG,28 5 "[t] he Fed was beginning to do,
in its own small way, what AIG had been doing in a much bigger
way. It was beginning to act as dealer of last resort to the capital
market" 28 6
To prevent "future AIGs," Dodd-Frank's Title VII OTC derivative
market reforms287 mandate that "standardized" OTC deivatives, in-
cluding credit default swaps, use CCPs to strengthen risk manage-
ment practices and to increase regulatory transparency. Yet it is
unclear that AIG's CDS were actually "clearing eligible, '" 2 18 and it
seems likely that the lax risk management practices involved in its
story stemmed at least in part from counterparties' comfort in a
deep-pocketed parent guarantor armed with an impeccable credit
rating. When the Federal Reserve rescued AIG, this formerly private
backstop became a public backstop. Title VIII's new last resort lend-
ing power potentially institutionalizes this role. It risks replicating
this "guarantor dynamic" by potentially replacing one deep-pock-
eted guarantor (AIG) with another (the U.S. government in the
form of the Federal Reserve).
Second, because Title VIII contains no restrictions on the types
of financial transactions handled by systemically significant finan-
cial market utilities, it likely expands the variety of private market
assets which will be available to collateralize any discount window
suggest why a market-maker of last resort is arguably necessary if a CCP requires emergency
liquidity.
284. See generally MEHR1INC., supra note 1, at 132-34.
285. In September 2008, AIG Financial Products Group (AIGFG) faced imminent finan-
cial collapse as its credit-default swap (CDS) counterparties demanded collateral payments it
could not meet. Its parent, AIG, had guaranteed these obligations. A credit default swap is an
insurance-like financial contract in which a protection "buyer" pays a premium to a protec-
tion "seller" to receive a certain payout if a credit event occurs for a designated entity. These
same counterparties had previously relaxed their risk management practices and rested se-
cure in guarantees provided by AIGFG's parent, AIG. Without emergency government finan-
cial assistance, AIG itself would have collapsed. See generally William K Sjostrum, Jr., The
AIG Bailout, Washington & Lee Law Review (2009).
286. MEHRLING, supra note 1, at 132.
287. See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 801-814, 124 Stat. 1376, 1802-22 (2010).
288. Finance experts such as Professor Darrell Duffle note that AIG's problematic CDSs
were not "standardized," so a CCP "solution" would have been inapplicable in AIG's case. See
Darrell Duffle, How Should We Regulate Derivatives Markets? (PEW Fin. Reform Project, Briefing
Paper No. 5, 2009), available at http://www.pewfr.org/project-reports detail?id-=001 7. Note
that what percentage of the OTC derivative markets will ultimately be sufficiently standard-
ized and, therefore, "clearing eligible" remains unclear.
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assistance. In an "unusual or exigent" circumstance, it is foresee-
able that the collateral available to secure discount window assis-
tance to such entities is likely to be a broad variety of financial
transactions or private market securities. To see why this could be
the case, it important to understand what would happen in the
event that a systemically important CCP were to become distressed.
A systemically significant CCP will most likely face financial dis-
tress as a result of default by one or more clearing members who
are unable to perform their obligations. 2 9 While the CCP has re-
course in its ability to sell the defaulting member(s)' portfolio(s),
market liquidity conditions may force it do so at a significant price
discount. This is exactly when a market-maker of last resort would
likely step in to provide a price floor to the portfolio's assets. There-
fore, it is foreseeable that the distressed CCP could offer the de-
faulting clearing member's portfolio as collateral to secure discount
window funding.
Third, Title VIII's last-resort lending authority is specifically
targeted to assist financial market utilities such as CCPs. As dis-
cussed in Part II, although one important function of a CCP is to
increase market liquidity. Systemically significant CCPs can be ex-
pected to play a particularly important role in promoting market
liquidity. Therefore, the legal authority in "unusual or exigent cir-
cumstances" to provide liquidity to designated, systemically
significant institutions promoting market liquidity makes the Fed-
eral Reserve an important potential last resort liquidity provider.
Fourth, Title VIII's credit and liquidity authority can potentially
be used to backstop many components of the market-based credit
system. One example is the repurchase agreement markets. The
market-based credit system primarily consists of repurchase agree-
ments collateralized by securitized assets.2 90 Discussions about re-
forms of the repurchase agreement markets often consider the use
of CCPs. 291 The two clearing banks in the tri-party repo markets are
essentially default CCPs that could fit within Title VIII's definition
of "financial market utility." In both cases, the Federal Reserve
could potentially use its new last-resort lending authority to amelio-
rate any critical disruptions in these markets, assuming proper des-
ignations and fulfillment of prerequisite requirements. As noted in
289. Technically, a CCP could face distress for other reasons, such as operational issues.
290. See generally Gary B. Gorton, supra note 3.
291. See, e.g., JEFF PENNEY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CENTRAL CLEARING OF REPURCHASE
AcREEMENTS 56-57 (2011), available at http://hosting.mckinsey.corn/clientservice/Financia
-Services/Knowledge-Highlights/Recent-Reports/-/media/Reprts/Financial-Services/
CIBRepo.ashx.
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Part II.B.2, Tide VIII does not limit the types of private market
securities or assets that are able to potentially receive its assistance.
Though Title VIII's new last-resort lending authority and the
market-maker of last-resort role it creates for the Federal Reserve
might appear to be merely a repositioning of the Federal Reserve's
pre-Dodd-Frank 13(3) emergency authority, several critical differ-
ences exist between these two powers as discussed in the previous
Part. Additionally, Title VIII's credit and liquidity authority is cre-
ated specifically for financial market utilities, especially those
providing financial market liquidity. Unquestionably, therefore, its
role is to provide last-resort market liquidity to systemically impor-
tant financial market utilities. Based upon the Financial Stability
Oversight Council's initial designations of systemically important fi-
nancial market utilities, the immediate intended target of Title
VIII's reforms, including its new credit and liquidity authority ap-
pears primarily to be CCPs.
Finally, if Title VIII's last resort lending authority merely repli-
cates the Federal Reserve's traditional 13(3) emergency power,
Congress could simply have noted in the statutory language that the
Federal Reserve's 13(3) power may also be used to assist certain
financial market utilities. Congress could have provided an exemp-
tion for designated financial market utilities in Dodd-Frank's
amendments to the Federal Reserve's 13(3) emergency authority,
which now require that the 13(3) power only be used for "programs
or facilities." As argued in Part II, it is unclear whether Title VIII's
credit and liquidity authority is actually restricted to emergency cir-
cumstances. It is for use in "unusual or exigent circumstances," but
not subject to the more restrictive "unusual and exigent circum-
stances" as in the case of the Federal Reserve's 13(3) emergency
authority. Unless and until Congress harmonizes this difference, a
significant legal difference will exist between these powers based
upon this fact alone. Therefore, in practice, Title VIII's expansive
definitions, concepts, and sweeping legal reforms result in a signifi-
cant, permanent, new expansion of the last-resort role of the Fed-
eral Reserve.
This transformation is particularly notable because of the impor-
tance of normative questions about the proper scope of the Federal
Reserve's last-resort role and its discount window policy. The pur-
pose of this Article is not to settle normative questions about
whether the Federal Reserve should be a market-maker of last resort
or the proper discount window policy, but rather to delineate the
financial utility reforms in Dodd-Frank's Title VIII and to argue that
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these reforms in practice importantly transform the role of the Fed-
eral Reserve. Because the Federal Reserve's new last resort role is
here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future, the aim of the next
Part is to propose additional reforms Congress fell short of imple-
menting that are necessary to accompany those it did implement in
Title VIII in order to promote the congressional objectives underly-
ing Dodd-Frank.
IV. REFORMS NEEDED TO ACCOMPANY THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S NEW
TITLE VIII RoLE OF MARKET-MAKER OF LAST RESORT
Opposition to the idea of a central bank acting as a market-
maker of last resort rests primarily in concerns about moral hazard,
decreased market discipline, and the potential for the mispricing of
financial risk. In the recent financial crisis, mispricing of financial
risk likely resulted from inadequate understandings of various fi-
nancial risk-taking activities2 92 and widespread financial market as-
sumptions that governments would not allow financial institutions
to fail whose failure could have significant negative externalities on
the financial system and broader economy.2 93 Importantly, Title
VIII risks both strengthening such assumptions and inadvertently
contributing to the further mispricing of liquidity risk. Therefore,
Congress should implement additional reforms, such as those pro-
posed in this Part, to counterbalance these risks and promote the
objectives of Dodd-Frank.
Banking law, regulation, and policy have traditionally accepted,
as the social "price" of a robust, solvent banking system, a tradeoff
between the creation of a certain amount of moral hazard, the re-
lated mispricing of financial risk, and federal stabilization of the
traditional banking system. The traditional banking system is heav-
ily regulated. Because of the presence of the federal safety net,
traditional banking institutions have always grappled with an im-
plicit tension between prudent risk management and shareholder
profit. This is one reason banks are heavily supervised and regu-
lated. Now that the federal safety net has been potentially extended
to systemically important financial market utilities such as certain
CCPs, these institutions will likely also struggle with this same
tension.
292. Coffee, supra note 204, at 822-23.
293. See generally RAJAN, supra note 45, at 160.
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Accordingly, this Part proposes additional reforms to accompany
those in Title VIII. These proposed reforms are designed to coun-
terbalance the moral hazard and related pricing distortions that Ti-
tle VIII's existing reforms could potentially create. These reforms
also aim to further promote stringent risk management practices.
Accordingly, Congress should implement reforms that include (1)
additional financial mandates, including required reserve balances
for any accounts at the central bank and the payment of a systemic
liquidity risk "insurance" premium; (2) increased disclosure and ac-
countability surrounding the use of Title VIII's last resort lending
authority; (3) infrastructure reforms of financial markets and insti-
tutions where Title VIII's last resort lending authority is most likely
to be used; and (4) increased second-to-last-resort private market
sources of liquidity.2 94
A. Additional Financial Requirements
By providing a staggering amount of emergency liquidity to fi-
nancial markets during the financial crisis,295 governments poten-
tially contributed to the further mismanagement and underpricing
of liquidity risk.2 96 This is because such actions reinforced financial
market expectations of central bank intervention. Title VIII's new
last resort lending authority risks similarly reinforcing financial
markets' anticipation of Federal Reserve assistance, especially if it is
not an emergency authority.297 Few financial market participants
likely believe that a too-big-to fail bank would be allowed to fail.
Even fewer likely believe this in the case of a systemically important
CCP. Therefore, given the inescapable tension between financial
294. A 1994 Chicago Federal Reserve Letter noted that "[a]t this date, attention has fo-
cused on the operating procedures [of clearinghouses] with little recognition of the power
brought to bear when loss-sharing arrangements cause private firms to have loss exposures
stemming from systemic problems." James T. Moser, What is Multilateral Clearing and Who
Cares?, Cmi. FEn LETTER, Nov. 1994, at 3, available at http://qa.chicagofed.org/digital-assets/
publications/chicago jed_letter/1994/cflnovemberl994 87.pdf. One reason CCP risk man-
agement practices have been historically robust is precisely because of private market risk
sharing through the practice of risk mutualization. See generally NoRMAN, supra note 21. The
potential of public assistance to certain CCPs risks weakening private market participants'
long standing monitoring incentives stemming from this risk mutualization.
295. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 59, at 76.
296. See RAJAN, supra note 45, at 159-60.
297. If Title VIII's new credit and liquidity authority is not an emergency authority, but
rather provides designated financial market utilities with access to the discount window in
non-emergency circumstances-as in the case of depository institutions-then such desig-
nated entities should be supervised and regulated similarly to depository institutions. In this
case, the language in Title VIII stating that systemically significant financial market utilities
need not be a bank or a bank holding company should be removed. See § 806(b).
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market stability and the creation of moral hazard, the best solution
is likely to implement measures to minimize pricing distortions.298
The optimal way to implement such solutions is with reforms de-
signed to "reprice" relevant financial transactions. This is the objec-
tive of the reforms proposed in this subpart.
1. Required Reserve Balances
Historically, the ability to maintain Federal Reserve bank ac-
counts and to access Federal Reserve services has been limited to
traditional depository institutions. 29" This has also been the case
with non-emergency access to the discount window. Title VIII "sub-
stantial [ly] change [d]" the law by permitting the Federal Reserve to
allow financial market utilities both to have accounts at Federal Re-
serve banks300 and to utilize Federal Reserve services such as
Fedwire, a component of the federal safety net.30 1
However, Title VIII does not mandate reserve requirements for
designated financial market utilities as federal law does in the case
of all depository institutions. Yet CCPs can default for many rea-
sons, including "the default of an investment counterparty. '" 3 0 2 In-
stead, Title VIII states that the Federal Reserve "may exempt a
designated financial market utility from, or modify any, reserve re-
quirements . . . applicable to a designated financial market util-
ity."303 Congress should remove this exemption. Required reserves
seem especially reasonable since the Federal Reserve "may pay earn-
ings on balances maintained by or on behalf of a designated
financial market utility in the same manner and to the same extent
as the Federal Reserve Bank may pay earnings to a depository insti-
tution. '" 30 4 If designated financial market utilities are eligible to re-
ceive many of the benefits of traditional depository institutions,
they should also share parallel regulatory burdens. One reason re-
serve requirements are mandated is because of liquidity risk and
298. See generally Rki,, supra note 45, at 159 (arguing that "[tihe concerns during the
recent crisis centered primarily on the underpricing of risk. Once again, it would be tempt-
ing but wrong to blame competition between banks. The right approach would be to reduce
the various distortions to the pricing of risk that stem from actual and potential government
intervention, as well as from herd behavior.")
299. See Paulson & Wells, supra note 217, at 2.
300. Id. (emphasis added).
301. See supra note 89.
302. See supra note 205.
303. Dodd-Frank § 806(d).
304. § 806(c).
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traditional depository institutions' access to the federal safety net.30 5
Although not their only function,3 0 6 mandated reserve require-
ments bolster the liquidity position of depository institutions. Simi-
larly, the liquidity positions of systemically significant financial
market utilities should be as robust as possible. Required reserves
could promote this objective. Accordingly, Congress should remove
this potential exemption.
Depository institutions not subject to reserve requirements have
also traditionally not had access to the discount window.0 7 In fact,
certain types of banks "voluntarily" agree to maintain reserve re-
quirements in exchange for discount window access.308 But just as
depository institutions are vulnerable to bank runs, so also are some
types of financial market utilities such as CCPs. And the potential
consequences of a systemically significant CCP experiencing a li-
quidity shortfall or run are much more worrisome than in the case
of a traditional banking institution.
A reserve requirement for systemically significant financial mar-
ket utilities would accomplish at least three purposes. First, it would
create an extra liquidity cushion for designated financial market
utilities in times of financial distress. Second, any excess reserve ac-
count balances at the central bank of designated financial market
utilities could also be traded among systemically significant finan-
cial market utilities to meet any funding shortages. This would
create an important second-to-last private market backstop that
should be implemented. A similar interbank market exists in which
banks trade excess reserve balances with each other.30 9
Third, a mandated reserve requirement would begin to establish
the foundation for a key domestic (and eventually international)
financial market infrastructure component: an international pri-
vate-market, second-to-last resort, publicly overseen backstop mech-
anism for systemically significant CCPs. For example, the
establishment of central bank liquidity swap lines between central
banks and CCPs has been proposed as a way to meet foreseeable
future last-resort liquidity needs by international CCPs.3 10 Of
305. See generally Alan Greenspan, Subsidies and Powers in Commercial Banking, Re-
marks at the Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition 10-11 (May 10, 1990),
available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/dos/historical/greenspan/Greenspan_19900510
.pdf.
306. As noted in Part 11, required reserves also play a role in monetary policy.
307. FED. RESrRvE BD., supra note 80, at 49.
308. Id.
309. The unsecured, overnight interest rate that banks charge one another in this market
is known as the federal funds rate. Id. at 16.
310. See generally Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve's Use of International Swap Lines
(working paper) (on file with author). See also Michael Watt, How the CCP Location Debate
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course, only the Federal Reserve is in a position to act as an interna-
tional dollar lender of last resort. Rather than rely upon central
bank last-resort lending in the first instance, pressure should be
placed on the private market, which originally developed the CCP,
to focus additional resources upon developing second-to-last-resort
international private market liquidity backstops.
Being a "lender of last resort" makes the Federal Reserve the
"bank" of last resort. Similarly, being a market-maker of last resort
makes the Federal Reserve in certain important respects the "cen-
tral clearing party of last resort." With its central bank liquidity swap
lines, the Federal Reserve has become the international dollar
lender of last resort.31' If the Federal Reserve were to be called
upon and actually provide last-resort dollar funding to foreign-lo-
cated CCPs, then it would truly have become the last resort.312
Because the Federal Reserve in its new role could potentially as-
sume certain important functions of a CCP, it should aso internally
implement some of CCPs traditional risk management practices
that have worked so well for so long in protecting the capital of
private market CCPs. 13 Consequently, the Federal Reserve's own
last-resort funding-which parallels a private CCP's capital-should
only be tapped once all other risk management layers and possibili-
ties had been exhausted. Within this framework, CCP central bank
accounts with mandated reserves or similar liquidity or collateral
requirements would parallel clearinghouse members' required
margin accounts at individual private market CCPs.
Many CCPs also have default funds that are tapped once the indi-
vidual margin account of a defaulting clearing member is
Helped Split the EU, RISK.NET (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/
2134744/ccp-location-debate-helped-split-eu ("Central banks already funnel liquidity to their
counterparts [via swap lines] when an injection of a given currency is needed, and some
regulators argue similar swap lines between central banks could be set up to support CCPs in
the event of a crisis.").
311. Id.
312. The reasonableness of this future possibility is suggested by 12 U.S.C.
§ 248(s)(4)(B), which defines the term "covered transaction" for purposes of Federal Re-
serve lending transactions that must be generally disclosed within a two-year period. See 12
U.S.C.A. § 248(s)(2)(B), (4)(B) (West 2012). Included within the definition of "covered
transaction" is "any open market transaction with a nongovernmental third party conducted
under the first undesignated paragraph of section 14 [12 US.C. § 353]." This statutory provi-
sion-12 USCS § 353-is a primary component of the Federal Reserve's swap line authority.
See generally Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve's Use of International Swap Lines (unpub-
lished article) (on file with author).
313. This solution is proposed based on existing regulatory reforms, not necessarily on
what would be the ideal reform solution.
[VOL. 46:1
The Federal Reserve As Last Resort
exhausted. 14 This risk management mechanism could be repli-
cated within the central bank by pooling the required reserves of
non-defaulting CCPs to create a default fund of private market
emergency credit and liquidity assistance, available at a penalty rate
to financially distressed, systemically significant CCPs. The CCP
could make ex ante arrangements among its clearing members to
absorb the cost of this assistance. As part of this central bank-super-
vised, second-to-last-resort private rescue, it would be helpful for
CCPs and other industry players to agree beforehand on a mecha-
nism for rescuing or buying a defaulting CCP's portfolio if neces-
sary.3 15 Finally, as part of this risk management arrangement,
financial regulators should ensure that all systemically important
CCPs publicly disclose enough information to financial markets
about their financial condition to enable robust market monitoring
and the creation of a market for CDS on CCPs as discussed below.
At least two considerations are highly relevant to implementing a
reserve requirement for designated financial market utilities. First,
providing central bank credit and liquidity threatens to decrease or
obviate traditional private market risk-sharing or mutualization
practices that have long characterized CCP design. Risk manage-
ment was a fundamental motivation behind the private market's
original development of CCPs. 3 16 Replicating these layers of risk
management at the central bank, which in some respects would be
a counterparty of last resort, could reinforce this private market risk
management mechanism.
Second, requiring the use of a CCP to clear complex OTC deriva-
tives and other financial transactions physically localizes global fi-
nancial market trading activity in a particular jurisdiction. This
could shift a disproportionate amount of the potential "rescue
costs" of international financial markets to certain jurisdictions.
Furthermore, this could allow one corporation owning CCPs in dif-
ferent jurisdictions to possibly arbitrage regulatory differences.
Clearly, it is essential to recognize both the inevitable international
linkages among CCPs and the likely potential risk of international
"runs" on CCPs in the future. The United States should lead inter-
national regulatory efforts to counteract these potential threats.
This leadership should take the form of implementing reserve or
liquidity requirements for systemically significant financial market
314. See generally NoRmAN, supra note 21.
315. See generally Nosal, supra note 16, at 137.
316. See generally Kroszner, supra note 24,
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utilities that can be aggregated into a super default fund at the cen-
tral bank to provide domestic, and eventually international, second-
to-last-resort private market backup liquidity and credit assistance.
In November 2011, the Federal Reserve provided last-resort dol-
lar liquidity to central banks around the world to help stabilize the
European debt crisis through central bank liquidity swaps. 317 The
Federal Reserve continues to provide this support. The Bank of En-
gland's December 2011 Financial Stability report warned that dis-
ruptions in markets for sovereign debt could threaten the stability
of central clearing parties.3 18 A related issue is the threat to
financial market stability that could be caused by any serious insta-
bility-due to sovereign debt or other issues-of any international
CCPs requiring U.S. dollars.31 9 One method of stabilizing such a
situation would be for the Federal Reserve to step into a more ex-
pansive international last-resort dollar liquidity role, as suggested
above. 320 Mispricing and mismanagement of liquidity risk lay at the
heart of the financial crisis. These challenges will likely continue in
international financial markets. It is highly foreseeable that systemi-
cally significant financial market utilities could also mismanage and
misprice their liquidity needs. The Federal Reserve's new market-
maker of last resort role could unintentionally increase this risk.
Market participants will likely resist mandated reserve or liquidity
requirements. However, such measures should ensure that the bur-
den of backstopping systemically significant financial market utili-
ties first falls on the financial industry itself. The industry is in the
best position to enforce market discipline and is the "public" that
most directly benefits from this highly risky activity.
317. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Coordinated Central
Bank Action to Address Pressures in Global Money Markets (Nov. 30, 2011), available at
http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20111130a.htm.
318. BANK OF ENG., supra note 32, at 20.
319. To see the significance of such issues, one only needs to reflect upon the controversy
in Europe over CCP location and central bank liquidity provision. See Michael Watt, Conserva-
tives Take CCPs to Heart After UK/EU Split, Risa MAG. (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.risk.net/risk-
magazine/news/2134996/conservatives-ccps-heart-uk-eu-split. France's central bank has
stated that
[g]iven the growing systemic importance of CCPs, if a CCP clears a significant volume
of euro-denominated contracts, we feel it is vital for it to have access to Eurozone
central bank liquidity in times of crisis. If Eurozone central banks are going to provide
liquidity to CCPs, they will require direct oversight of these institutions, hence the
request for such infrastructures to be located within the Eurozone. There will be no
change from our side on this matter.
Id. (quoting Philippe Troussard, Head of Payments and Market Infrastructures Oversight at
the Banque de France).
320. See generally Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve's Use of international Swap Lines (unpub-
lished article) (on file with author).
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2. Liquidity Risk Premium
At a minimum, Title VIII's new last resort power potentially pro-
vides catastrophic liquidity risk insurance to designated financial
market utilities. As discussed above, however, it could conceivably
also provide liquidity assistance in non-emergency but "unusual"
circumstances. This new lending authority, in combination with
other Title VIII reforms, creates a significant expansion of the fed-
eral safety net. Therefore, a liquidity risk insurance premium
should be appropriately valued to "reprice" any liquidity risk that
could be mispriced by introducing this potential government
backstop. 32'
In various financial market contexts, several scholars have pro-
posed charging a risk premium to systemically risky financial institu-
tions likely to benefit from a government safety net.3 22 Alan
Greenspan, for example, commented that expansion of the federal
safety net likely requires "additional market-simulating ways of limit-
ing moral hazard" such as insurance premiums.32 3 This Article pro-
poses that systemically significant financial market utilities be
charged an appropriately priced liquidity risk premium.
The purpose of such premiums would be at least two-fold. First,
they would encourage proper pricing of the financial risks involved
in the relevant financial market activity. 324 CCP risk-sharing prac-
tices are designed to insure against risk. Title VIII's last-resort lend-
ing authority could unintentionally, but potentially, put some of
this risk instead to the central bank. This potential put should be
paid for because the central bank risks essentially functioning as an
insurer of last resort.3 25 Therefore, the proposed liquidity risk pre-
mium would be similar to an insurance premium. Second, such
321. Congress could assign this task to the new Office of Financial Research created in
Dodd-Frank. See Dodd-Frank § 152.
322. For example, Gordon and Muller propose a standby "systemic emergency funding
authority" that would be partially pre-funded by industry and available to the broad financial
system. Gordon & Muller, supra note 101, at 2. They propose an initial $1 trillion dollar
facility, which would be funded by "risk-adjusted assessments on all large financial firms, who
benefit from systemic stability." Id. This facility would be subject to ongoing monitoring,
congressional review of fund use, and other possible legislative oversight aimed to maintain
legitimacy and accountability. Id. Thus, risk mutualization would be part of the plan and
fund losses would be recovered from industry. Id. A general "ex-ante guarantee fund" for
central counterparties has also been suggested. SeeJulia Lees Allen, Note, Derivatives Clearing-
houses and Systemic Risk: A Bankruptcy and Dodd-Franh Analysis, 64 STAN. L. R-N. 1079, 1107
(2012).
323. Greenspan, supra note 305, at 13.
324. The aim of this insurance premium is to implement a tax on such transactions that is
sufficient to remove any pricing subsidy resulting from Title ViII's potential catastrophic li-
quidity insurance.
325. See supra note 135.
FALL 2012]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
premiums could augment the central bank default fund (the
second-to-last-resort fund discussed above).
Dodd-Frank's Title VIII mandate to clear standardized OTC de-
rivatives using CCPs should increase the systemic importance of
•CCPs and the volume of transactions they clear. Given the wide-
spread underpricing of liquidity risk in the financial crisis, it seems
particularly important to focus on measuring the systemic liquidity
risk of designated CCPs and appropriately pricing a catastrophic
liquidity risk insurance premium.32 6 Congress should therefore
amend Title VIII to mandate an assessment of this fee in addition
to mandating required reserve balances or reserve liquidity for sys-
temically significant CCPs. This assessment could take many forms,
such as "a macroprudential capital surcharge, fee, tax, insurance
premium," an alternative charge,32 7 or even a combination of these
options.
B. Additional Accountability and Disclosure
In many important respects, Title VIII's last-resort lending au-
thority somewhat parallels the Federal Reserve's traditional, re-
cently circumscribed 13(3) emergency power that had not been
used since the Great Depression era. As discussed, however,
important differences also exist. Dodd-Frank mandated additional
disclosure and accountability requirements in the use of the Fed-
eral Reserve's 13(3) emergency authority. These reforms, discussed
in Part I, responded to widespread concerns about the Federal Re-
serve's expansive use of its 13(3) emergency power during the re-
cent financial crisis. Although important similarities exist between
these two discount window lending authorities, Dodd-Frank did not
fully mandate similar disclosure and accountability requirements
for Title VIII's last-resort lending authority. For example, the Fed-
eral Reserve merely needs to "consult" with the Treasury Depart-
ment, not necessarily obtain its approval,328 in using Title VIII's
credit and liquidity authority.32 9 Dodd-Frank does not require the
Federal Reserve to develop policies and procedures for the use of
326. Finance scholars have increasingly focused on measuring the benefits provided by
the government safety net. See, e.g., Edward Kane, Redefining and Containing Systemic Risk
(May 8, 2010) (working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1603323.
327. INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 59, at 75.
328. Seeking U.S. Treasury approval could risk Federal Reserve independence, so this
Article does not advocate that Congress make this a requirement.
329. "Consultation" rather than "approval" as in the case of the Federal Reserve's 13(3) is
arguably the preferable course.
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this authority, to follow prescribed collateral valuation policies, to
ensure that all Title VUII borrowers are solvent, or to make specific
reports to Congress about its use. Congress should require all four,
especially because Title VIII's last resort lending authority could po-
tentially be used even more expansively than the Federal Reserve's
13(3) emergency authority.
Congress should enact collateral, solvency, accountability, and
transparency requirements for Title VIII's lending authority that
appropriately parallel those that now govern the Federal Reserve's
13(3) emergency authority. Congress should also require that the
Federal Reserve develop policies and procedures for its use. The
purpose of the discount window is to provide temporary, last-resort
liquidity to certain solvent but illiquid financial institutions. Histori-
cally, however, insolvent financial institutions have sometimes re-
ceived assistance, even for prolonged periods of time.330 Therefore,
there is a risk that a distressed CCP could similarly receive discount
window funding for a sustained period of time. This risk is likely
heightened in the case of a systemically significant financial market
utility as substantially greater risk and uncertainty could be ex-
pected to surround the potential insolvency of a distressed CCP.
Although an insolvent, systemically significant financial market
utility should theoretically be resolved under Dodd-Frank's new or-
derly liquidation authority, the use of this authority is ultimately left
to regulatory discretion.3 31 Given the likely complexity of resolving
an insolvent, systemically significant financial institution such as a
CCP, regulators could have strong incentives to forbear 32 from
resolution. 3 3
In order to counteract the tension potentially presented by coun-
tervailing regulator interests, Congress should require appropriate
accountability, collateral valuation, solvency, and disclosure re-
quirements in the use of Title VIII's last resort lending authority.
These accountability and disclosure requirements should, at a mini-
mum, include policies and procedures for the use of Title VIII's last
resort lending authority. Such policies and procedures should be
designed to guard against assistance to insolvent designated finan-
cial market utilities (though such distinctions will be difficult, if
possible at all), to disclose details of the collateralization of dis-
count window funding, to require that collateral accepted to secure
330. See generally Schwartz, supra note 102, at 59.
331. See Title VII of Dodd-Frank.
332. See generally Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC
Improvement Act of 1991, 12 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 317, 317-18 (1993),
333. See generally Allen, supra note 322, at 1099.
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discount window funds be assigned a value, and to require timely
reports to Congress while such last resort lending is outstanding.
The congressional reporting requirement should be at least as
comprehensive as that mandated for the Federal Reserve's 13(3)
emergency authority.334 This Article recommends more timely re-
porting requirements. For example, within seventy-two hours, ini-
tial disclosures should be made to the appropriate congressional
committees. 335 Disclosure within one year should be made to the
general public instead of the currently mandated two-year time-
lag.-3 6 Such mandates should not be problematic for temporary,
emergency uses of Title VIII's last-resort lending authority. Timely
public disclosure will act as an important countervailing pressure to
any potential financial industry pressures. 37
Of utmost importance is that collateral disclosure and valuation
requirements similar to those mandated by Dodd-Frank in the use
of the Federal Reserve's 13(3) emergency power also be mandated
for Title VIII's last-resort lending authority. Currently, the only col-
lateral restriction on Title VIII's credit and liquidity authority is that
the Federal Reserve must deem such collateral acceptable, 3 8 as in
the case of the Federal Reserve's 13(3) emergency power pre-
Dodd-Frank. Therefore, the Federal Reserve should disclose details
and comprehensive valuations of the collateral accepted to secure
Tide VIII lending within both its reports to Congress and to the
public. This requirement is critical because the Federal Reserve's
collateral acceptance policy is at the heart of its new role as market-
maker of last resort. Shortages of high-quality collateral can exist.339
Regulatory initiatives focused on central clearing have put even
more stress on this supply, resulting in shortages . 40 Consequently,
334. See 12 U.S.C.A. 343(C) (West 2012).
335. These committees are the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and
the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
336. Any use of Title VIII's discount window lending authority must be disclosed within
two years. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 248(s)(2)(B) (West 2012).
337. Professor Rajan explains that, from a general perspective, "[ilf the gathered infor-
mation [regarding specific financial risks] were made public... it could offer a measure of
public oversight over supervision .... Public exposure can reduce tail risk taking in its early
stages, for tail risk is of significant value to management at that stage only if the public is
unaware of the extent of the company's exposure to risk." RAJAN, supra note 296, at. 166-67.
CCPs are primarily designed to manage tail risk. Therefore, appropriately designed public
disclosure mandates are a particularly important risk management measure.
338. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 343 (West 2012)
339. See generally Telis Demos, CME to Accept Corporate Bonds as Collateral, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
9, 2012, http://www.ft.com/int/cms/s/0/2e21b2e6-533b-llel-950d-OO144feabdcO.html#
axzz23TMPZeog.
340. See id.
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these regulatory measures are imperative because designated cen-
tral clearing parties are increasingly accepting a broader array of
collateral 3 4 1 ultimately increasing the risk of central banks "rescu-
ing fools."
C. Restructuring Vulnerable Financial Markets
The effectiveness of financial mandates and heightened account-
ability, disclosure, and collateral requirements must be reinforced
by restructuring vulnerable financial market infrastructures (such
as the tri-party repo markets) that potentially lie within the scope of
Title VIII's credit and liquidity authority.342 Robust market infra-
structures should decrease the potential need for last-resort public
market liquidity assistance. A contribution of this Article is to note
that Title VIII's last-resort lending authority could be used to man-
age future disruptions in the bilateral or tri-party repo markets, or
to support a distressed CCP that clears repos. The repo markets,
particularly the tri-party repo343 markets, are an important example.
Dealer banks use this market, which needs structural reform,344 to
finance their securities.3 45 Disruptions in the tri-party repo markets
during the financial crisis were highly problematic, 346 and financial
341. Id.
342. This possibility is reasonable considering the critical disruptions that occurred in
these markets during the financial crisis. As has been noted, these markets have not be signif-
icantly restructured since the financial crisis, so it is reasonable to think that future repeats of
such disruptions are possible. Financial regulators have reportedly even considered designat-
ing these markets as "systemically significant." For this last point, see Jon Hilsenrath & Liz
Rappaport, Heat's on Triparty Repos, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702303877604577382511925598298.html.
343. The Financial Stability Oversight Council's report suggests that "the regulatory com-
munity should exert its supervisory authority over the industry's reform efforts to ensure that
the Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform Task Force meets its commitments as promptly as
possible." FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2011), available at
http://www.treasnry.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/FSOCAR2011 .pdf.
344. Gillian Tett, Repo Needs a Backstop to Avoid Future Crises, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/inti/cms/S/0/692d4l84-c72d-I 1df-aebl-001 44feab49a.html#axzz23TMP
Zeog.
345. Adam Copeland, Darrell Duffle, Antoine Martin & Susan McLaughlin, Policy Issues
in the Design of Tri-Party Repo Markets 1 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://www. darrellduffie.com / uploads / working / Copeland Duffle Martin McLaughlin-
WorkingJuly%2023 201 1.pdf.
346. See, e.g., Henny Sender & Michael Mackenzie, Fed to Shake Up Repo Markets in Wake of
Lehman Brothers Failure, FIN. TIMVs, June 22, 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5a615b6
c-5ec5-1 lde-91 ad-00]44feabdcO.html#axzz23TMPZeog.
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regulators have increasingly focused their attention on these
markets.3 47
A Financial Stability Oversight Council Annual Report (Report)
warns that "the weakness in the tri-party repo market are most likely
to amplify current risks"348 and notes that it was
[a] notable exception to the smooth operation of payment, clearing,
and settlement systems [during the financial crisis]. The weak-
nesses in the settlement infrastructure in this market and the
attendant flaws in the risk management practices of borrowers,
lenders, and the two clearing banks significantly amplified
market instability.349
The Report warns that "[t]hese weaknesses, if they are not ad-
dressed, will continue to have the potential to exacerbate volatility
in the overall financial system during times of stress.."350 Were this to
happen, Title VIII's last-resort lending authority could be necessary
to forestall "runs." Private market task forces are working to address
tri-party repo market infrastructure reform. 351 While this work is
necessary, helpful, and likely to generate some of the most produc-
tive ideas for reforms-as in the case of the over-the-counter deriva-
tive markets-these potential solutions might be insufficiently
implemented unless mandated by Congress. Among the considera-
tions in repo market reform efforts is the question of whether
greater use should be made of central clearing parties in the repo
markets.352 AIG's financial collapse was an important impetus be-
hind Dodd-Frank's OTC derivative market reforms to require
greater use of CCPs.35 3 Likewise, Bear Stearns and Lehman Broth-
ers' collapses, which caused disruptions in the tri-party repo
markets, probably should have been an important impetus for par-
allel structural reforms in the tri-party repo markets. 54 These con-
tinuing vulnerabilities are likely one important motivation behind
the creation of Title VIII's new last resort lending authority.
347. See generally, e.g., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, STRENGTHENING REPO CLEARING AND
SETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/pub/cpss91.pdf; FED.
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., TRI-PARTY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM (2010); PAYMENTS RISK
COMM., TASK FORCE ON TRi-PARTY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE (2010).
348. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 343, at 144 (emphasis added).
349. Id. at 94.
350. Id.
351. See generally PAYMENTS RISK COMM., supra note 351, at 3.
352. See generally Duffie, supra note 7.
353. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 701-774, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641-1802
(2010).
354. See Sender & Mackenzie, supra note 346.
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The current path of tri-party repo market reform followed by the
private market resembles that originally pursued by the private mar-
ket in the OTC derivative market.3 55 This approach ultimately
proved inadequate and did not prevent the failure of AIG. The
OTC derivative markets experienced many of the same issues that
continue to concern regulators in the tri-party repo markets, such
as counterparty credit risk. Many of the rationales behind Dodd-
Frank's requiring that standardized OTC derivatives be cleared us-
ing CCPs, such as lack of transparency, market infrastructure
weaknesses, counterparty credit risk, and systemic risk creation, re-
main important concerns in the tri-party repo market.3 56 The Re-
port specifically listed three primary areas of reform: liquidity risk
management, preventing runs, and managing dealer insolvency.357
All three of these concerns could be mitigated by the use of a
third-party, neutral CCP in the repo markets to enforce robust risk
management practices, improve handling of potential participant
defaults, and lessen counterparty credit risk for market participants.
These measures would possibly decrease the incentive for the with-
drawal of funds in times of market crisis. A CCP could also mini-
mize collateral risk358 and improve market transparency. This
should strengthen risk management practices generally, which in
turn should minimize the need for public credit and liquidity back-
stops3'5 such as Title VIII's last-resort lending authority.
D. Additional Private Market Backstops
Finally, as noted by a 1994 Chicago Fed Letter,36° private market
"loss-sharing arrangements" 361 for central clearing parties can be
particularly effective. Such loss-sharing arrangements should align
private and public risk management incentives more effectively
than public backstops alone. Title VIII's last-resort lending author-
ity not only risks decreasing market discipline, but also decreasing
private market incentives to create innovative private market risk
355. For example, prior to Congress's Dodd-Frank reforms, private industry groups such
The Counterparty Risk Management Policy focused on industry reforms. See Counterparty Risk
Management Group, COUNTERPART RISK MANAGEMENT GRP., http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/
(last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
356. See generally FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 343.
357. See id.
358. INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 59, at 75.
359. Id.
360. Moser, supra note 294.
361. Id.
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management solutions. A possible private market solution, in addi-
tion to replicating CCP risk-management layers within the central
bank to create a second-to-last private market layer of emergency
liquidity,3 62 is a credit default swap (CDS) market for CCPs. 63
In the past, some CCPs have had insurance, but there has been a
general "withdrawal of providers from the market."364 A developed
CDS market for CCPs could provide several important benefits.
First, CDS generally provide the best estimate of an entity's credit
risk. Although credit rating agencies evaluate the credit risk of cen-
tral clearing parties, these ratings can have shortcomings. Second, a
market estimate of the credit risk of a CCP could also facilitate a
more accurate pricing of the systemic liquidity risk premium dis-
cussed in Part IV.A. Third, and most importantly, providing CDS
protection against CCP default would remind financial markets and
the public that CCPs can fail. Fourth, the credit risk information
conveyed by CDS would counterbalance industry pressures for reg-
ulatory forbearance that financial regulators could encounter when
considering a regulatory response to a financially distressed CCP.
CDSs have been controversial. And suggesting a CDS market on
CCPs is likely also to be controversial for some of the very reasons
that it could be helpful. CDSs on CCPs could be highly problem-
atic. But the primary benefit of this suggestion lies ultimately in the
ability of CDSs to highlight potential problems, such as safety and
soundness concerns about systemically significant CCPs, which
could otherwise receive too little attention. CDSs on CCPs would
remind the market that designated financial market utilities are not
risk-free, that they too can face distress or even fail. Finally, CDS on
CCPs would also vividly tease out many of the public-private policy
complexities present when private market "legal devices" 365 are
used by governments for public policy purposes.
CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to contribute to legal scholarship on one of the
world's most important and powerful institutions, the U.S. Federal
362. See Part IV.A.
363. Financial market commentators have also mentioned this possibility. See, e.g., Kevin
McPartland, Reinventing the Credit Default Swap: CDS on CCP, TABB FORUM (Oct. 15, 2010),
http://tabbforum.com/opinions/reinventing-the-credit-default-swap-cds-on-ccp.
364. NoRMAN, supra note 21, at 10.
365. See generally Joanne P. Braithwaite, Private Law and the Public Sector's Central
Counterparty Prescription for the Derivatives Markets I (London Sch. of Econ. Legal Studies,
Working Paper No. 2, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract--1791740.
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Reserve. Although normative questions regarding whether central
banks should act as market-makers of last resort remain unresolved,
the financial market utility reforms in Dodd-Frank's Title VIII have
propelled the Federal Reserve into this new role on a permanent
basis.
This new last-resort role raises serious moral hazard concerns
and may contribute to further mispricing of financial risk, particu-
larly liquidity risk, in financial markets. Ironically, these very issues
are among those that led to the financial crisis and the enactment
of Dodd-Frank in the first place. To counteract the mispricing of
financial risk likely to be associated with Title VIII's new last resort
lending authority, it is imperative that Congress implement addi-
tional reforms such as increased financial mandates, bolstered
transparency and accountability measures, solvency mandates, and
robust collateral valuation requirements. Congress must also re-
quire restructuring of financial markets most likely to require the
assistance of a market-maker of last resort. By bolstering financial
regulation in these ways, Congress can balance the potential need
for the Federal Reserve's new last-resort financial market stability
role with the moral hazard and increased financial market instabil-
ity this new role itself could create.
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